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ABSTRACT 
The United States government created America's third coastal defense system 
during the early-to-mid nineteenth century based upon the recommendations of the 
Board of Engineers of 1816. The engineers of 1816 believed the most economical 
means of protecting America was the construction of large, permanent forts along key 
areas of America's coast. 
Union forces under Brigadier General Quincy Gillmore seized Fort Pulaski in 
April of 1862. Pulaski was one of the most formidable forts built under the third 
system. Gillmore required two months to install the weapons used against Pulaski; 
most of the time was spent installing smoothbore Columbiads, the standard breaching 
weapon of the day. Yet the weapons that destroyed Pulaski were lighter, rifled guns. 
Gillmore attributed the fort's destruction to rifled weapons, and found the smoothbore 
guns practically worthless during the engagement. 
All forts built by Southern engineers prior to the fall of Pulaski, prior to the 
proof of the superiority of rifled weapons over permanent works, were earthen forts. 
Masonry's obsolescence was not a factor in the decision to build earthen works. The 
South needed forts immediately, for it faced an enemy that had invaded its soil and 
established a base on its shores. The change in construction material from masonry 
to earth was not in response to the recognition of a new threat, the rifled weapon, but 
because the Confederacy lacked the time and resources to build forts like Pulaski. 
Earthen forts like Fort McAllister, Georgia, were able to withstand repeated 
vii 
attacks by the United States Navy and emerged unscathed. The largest guns in 
Federal service, 15" Columbiads, were used on several occasions against McAllister. 
The fort did not fall until assaulted by a greatly superior land force. 
Although the lessons provided by earthen forts did not change the immediate 
future of coastal defenses, they did have an impact later in the nineteenth century. 
Under the Endicott system of the 1880s, engineers constructed coastal forts as one-tier 
works with dispersed batteries. The materials used were earth and reinforced 
concrete. By the tum of the century the impressive forts of the third system were 
abandoned in favor of the Endicott forts. 
I: 
America's Coastal Defense 
and the Bernard Report 
During the opening months of the American Civil War, Confederate engineers 
supervised the construction of earthen coastal forts capable of withstanding the power 
of spiraling projectiles. The change in construction material from masonry to earth 
was not in response to the recognition of a new threat, the rifled gun, but due to the 
cost of fort construction. The Confederacy did not have the money, materials or time 
required to construct bastions of brick and mortar. What the Confederacy did have 
was plenty of earth, timber and slaves. Earthen forts were inexpensive, easy to build 
and practically invincible against bombardments from the United States Navy, 
although most eventually fell when assaulted from land. 
The U.S. Government initially delegated the construction of permanent coastal 
works to the Army Corps of Engineers in 1802. Construction of these works spanned 
decades and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. American military engineers 
considered Fort Pulaski, which guarded the coastal entrance to Savannah, Georgia, to 
be one of the strongest forts in the American coastal defense when it was completed 
1 
2 
in 1847 (see illustration #1, "Savannah River Area").l Ironically, Pulaski became the 
first fort obliterated by the new use of an old idea: the rifled gun. 
Fort Pulaski, located on Cockspur Island at the mouth of the Savannah River, 
acquired its name from the Polish Count Casmimir Pulaski who died while defending 
Savannah against a British attack during the American Revolution. 2 Construction of 
the fort began in 1828 and was officially completed in 1847. The fort had walls 
seven and a half feet thick, constructed of brick. Pulaski fell quickly when attacked 
because its walls were inflexible; instead of the walls absorbing or deflecting artillery 
rounds like other construction material, they crumbled. Pulaski was comprised of a 
pentagon-shaped main work surrounded by a moat and had an advance battery. At 
the time bombardment began on 10 April 1862, the fort housed a garrison of 385 
troops armed with forty-eight guns of mixed calibers. The commanding officer, 
Colonel Charles H. Olmstead, surrendered the fort on 11 April 1862 after federal 
batteries breached the southeast wall (see illustration #2, "Tybee Island").3 
Earthen forts like Fort McAllister, which guarded the southernmost river 
entrance to Savannah, withstood repeated attacks from the largest and most powerful 
smoothbore and rifled weapons in the U.S. Navy's arsenal. McAllister began as an 
impromptu battery of field pieces established to guard the Ogeechee River at a place 
lRogers W. Young, "Board of Engineers" , The Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. 
20,49. 
2Georgia State Archives, Atlanta, Georgia. "Forts", 1542-17, 5V. 
3General Q. A. Gillmore, Official Report to the United States Engineer 
Department of the Siege and Reduction of the Fort Pulaski Georgia (New York: Van 
Nostrand, 1862) 9 & 36. 
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5 
called Genesis Point, the "back door" to Savannah. The fort received its name from a 
prominent local family who owned the land. Construction of the fort began late in 
January 1861 and eventually included several bombproofs to house munitions, 
supplies and a hospital. Improvements to the work included a ditch, a retractable 
bridge, palisades and land mines. McAllister resisted nine attacks by Union ships. 
The fort did not fall until 13 December 1864, when nine regiments of the Fifteenth 
U. S. Army Corps stormed the fort and disarmed the 230 man garrison. 
HISTORY OF U.S. COASTAL DEFENSE 
Because the Confederacy adopted the framework of the U. S. coastal defense 
system, an understanding of America's early defense strategy is necessary in order to 
put Forts Pulaski and McAllister into perspective. In 1816 Congress authorized a 
board of military officers to create an integrated coastal defense plan. President 
James Madison appointed to the board Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Totten (U .S. 
Army), Captain Jesse D. Elliott (U.S. Navy) and Brevet Brigadier General Simon 
Bernard (U.S. Army).4 Members of the board continued to survey the United States 
coast after the issuance of their report in 1821, and spent a total of sixteen years 
4Totten served on the board for its sixteen year existence and spent twenty years 
as Chief of Engineers for the U.S. Army until his death in 1864. In his honor this 
system of coastal defense is referred to as the "Totten" system. Bernard was a French 
military engineer and served as Napoleon Bonaparte's aide-de-camp. After returning to 
French service in 1832, he was promoted to Lieutenant General. He served in positions 
of aide-de-camp to the king, Inspector General and twice briefly as Minister of War. 
6 
mapping the U.S. from Maine to Georgia, and parts of the Gulf coast. 5 Their report 
covered the use of the navy as both an offensive and defensive force, the 
establishment of coastal and harbor fortifications in strategic areas, the necessity of 
good interior lines of communication and the creation of a regular army with a well-
organized militia.6 For sixty years the report served as the most important document 
with respect to America's coastal defense and influenced future leaders of both the 
United States and the Confederacy. 
There were several aspects of American society that the board's members had 
to take into consideration if they were to convince Congress to act upon their report. 
First and foremost, Americans feared that a large standing army could be used against 
them. 7 Second, Congress consciously decided to rest the safety of the nation on its 
citizen-soldiers even though, as a general rule, militia units could not stand 
successfully against an army of regular soldiers in open battle. Because militias were 
politically and locally popular they retained a strong presence in American military 
policy. Third, the federal government operated on a very small budget. It simply 
5National Park Service, "Tales of Old Fort Monroe, Pamphlet #4: General Simon 
Bernard: Aide to Napoleon, Designer of Fort Monroe" (Fort Monroe: The Casemate 
Museum, 1993) 3. 
6"Revised Report of the Board of Engineers on the Defense of Coast of the United 
States, 1826" [RRBE], Record Group 77, Box 2, United States Archives, Washington 
D.C. 
7This fear was inherited from the British tradition. The Newberg Conspiracy of 
1783, when George Washington dispersed a large group of Colonial officers on the verge 
of rebelling, reinforced these fears. The Society of the Cincinnati, composed of 
Revolutionary War Officers and their descendants, also strengthened fears about the 
military. 
7 
could not afford to spend large sums of money on defense year after year. Another 
item that factored into the report was America's geographical isolation from European 
powers. The primary foreign threat to the U.S. would come from the sea, with Great 
Britain being the most likely adversary due to unresolved issues from the War of 
1812. 
THE BERNARD REPORT8 
The militia was a popular organization, but not a militarily strong or efficient 
one. The board recognized that Congress would not enlarge the regular army and had 
to find some way to compensate for the militia's deficient military skills. The board 
did this by recommending an active navy capable of being both an offensive and a 
defensive force, and by strongly recommending a massive construction program for 
coastal fortifications. 
The U.S. Navy could work independently and in conjunction with coastal 
defenses. Offensively, the navy could be used to seek out an invasion force and sink 
its transports. In this light the navy could be seen as a limited offensive force and 
still be justified to Congress because of its primarily defensive role. Building a fleet 
during the 1820s cost approximately $6,600 per gun for ships-of-the-line, $6,500 for 
frigates and just under $5,000 for smaller ships. Maintenance costs ran seven to eight 
8RRBE, Record Group 77, Box 2. 
8 
percent of the original figures per annum, which was less than the cost to support 
ground units with the same number of men. 9 
The bulk of the report dealt directly or indirectly with coastal fortifications. 
Approximately two thousand miles of shoreline ran from Maine to Georgia but only a 
few places had developed into mature harbors. 1O Fortifications denied the enemy 
prime spots for landing an army and increased the difficulty of amphibious landings. 
The works provided militia units a better position from which to defend while waiting 
for regular troops to arrive. II The integration of militiamen into garrisons was easier 
than integration into mobile armies. Forts also gave militiamen added confidence. 
An underlying theme throughout the report was economy. It played a very 
important role in developing the defense strategy. In financial terms coastal 
fortifications and the militia were the most economical instruments available for 
defense. Forts lasted decades and militiamen were only paid if utilized. 12 The 
9Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: or Course of 
Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles & Embracing the Duties of Staff. 
Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineer. Adapted to the use of Volunteers and 
Militia (New York: D. Appleton and Company, orig. pub. 1846) 207. One should be 
cautioned that these figures are rough estimates only, for accurate records were not kept 
for all vessels. 
IOGilbert Sumter Guinn, Coastal Defense of the Confederate Atlantic Seaboard 
States 1861-1865: A Study in Political and Military Mobilization, dissertation (Columbia, 
South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1973) 1. 
llRussell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States 
Military Strategy and Policy (New York: MacMillian Publishing Company, Inc, 1973) 
60. 
12Emmanuel Lewis, Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory 
History (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Press, 1970) 4. 
9 
Bernard report recommended using forts still in existence from the Revolutionary War 
if possible as a way to conserve funds. 
Important works could be manned by the same number of regular troops in 
war as in peace, with local militia units supplementing the strength in a crisis. 
During peacetime the cost of maintenance of permanent works was kept to a 
minimum by garrisoning a company of men or hiring caretakers. The added cost of 
training raw recruits did not exist and volunteers ate and slept at home, further 
reducing costs. Using this defensive approach only required the U.S. to raise a small 
offensive force to seek out the enemy in time of war. The report also pointed out the 
hidden savings achieved by reducing the drain on the work force and allowing the 
economy to continue at a more normal pace. 
The Board listed three areas of priority for coastal construction, selecting 
specific harbors and coastal sites for each priority. Military convenience as well as 
economic prudence dictated the use of major commercial ports as naval bases. 
Therefore the first priority was the construction of forts to protect America's largest 
cities, naval bases, roads of rendezvous and "positions that could do great harm to the 
country. 1113 Savannah was included as a priority one area. 
The projected cost of construction for the first three priorities was $16.54 
million dollars. The cost was broken down as follows: priority one forts, $9.69 
million; priority two forts, $2.31 million; priority three forts, $4.54 million. The 
13RRBE, RG 77, Box 2. 
peacetime garrisons for these forts were 2,610 men, 666 men and 3,911 men 
respectively. 
To justify the expense of construction the report discussed in detail the 
theoretical cost of repelling an invading army of 20,000 soldiers without the use of 
fortifications. The report estimated the cost of raising, training, equipping and 
campaigning 77,000 troops (the estimated number required) for six months to be 
$23.1 millionY With a cost of $17 million and a life span of decades, coastal forts 
were a bargain. 
10 
The 1821 Bernard report gave specific recommendations for improving 
America's defense and backed those recommendations with surveys and numbers 
justifying the expense. The report was the first attempt to standardize and integrate 
the coastal defenses of the United States. It reinforced the ideas and beliefs held 
among Congressional leaders regarding the military and encouraged them to continue 
with a small army supported by militia. Because of the report's importance, its 
contents would have been known to future Confederate leaders, such as Jefferson 
Davis who served as U.S. Secretary of War under President Franklin Pierce. The 
Report remained the cornerstone for America's coastal defense until the Endicott 
Report of 1886, which incorporated new technologies and lessons learned from the 
American Civil War. 
14All figures found in RRBE. 
11 
CONFEDERATE COASTAL DEFENSES 
Why did the United States view Pulaski alone as sufficient to protect Savannah 
whereas the Confederate government in Georgia felt the need to build McAllister? 
This thesis is concerned with Southern strategy only as it related to coastal defense, to 
put into proper perspective why the forts were built and defended at their respective 
locations. 
Confederate priorities paralleled those listed in the Bernard report: to protect 
vital areas and force an enemy to land as far away from those areas as possible. 
However, the Confederacy had additional reasons for defending its ports. Southern 
states did not have the military materials to fight a prolonged war; Confederate 
industry was in its infancy. If the war continued for an extended time, imports of 
military hardware would become critical. 15 
Money became an equally important reason for keeping port cities open. Due 
to the South's agricultural economy, the majority of its capital was invested in land, 
slaves and cash crops. Export of cotton and tobacco was absolutely vital for raising 
revenue. Confederate President Jefferson Davis initially favored rationing exports in 
hopes that European textile industries would pay exorbitant prices and pressure their 
governments to mediate a truce. 16 This economic goal was closely tied to a third and 
15James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988) 547. 
16Davis recognized the failure of this policy, for European textile industries had 
stockpiled American cotton prior to the war and then found new sources after the war 
had started. The Confederate government also failed to properly regulate and enforce 
the growing and export of cotton. 
12 
arguably the most important reason for keeping port cities open: diplomatic 
recognition. 17 Confederate ports were the only links to the outside world. The 
C.S.A. sought military aid and recognition from Britain and France. Before these 
nations would openly assist, they had to officially recognize the Confederacy. If the 
South were still part of the Union, as U.S. President Abraham Lincoln insisted, then 
he would have declared its southern ports closed. Instead Lincoln issued a blockade 
of the ports, tacitly recognizing the Confederacy as a separate entity. This situation 
may have involved semantics, but was an important step toward recognition. 
Because the C.S.A. did not have much of a navy, forts were more important 
for the defense of southern cities than for northern cities. Savannah was one of only 
three Confederate port cities of significance on the Atlantic coast. 18 After the fall of 
Pulaski in 1862, McAllister kept Savannah open. Even as late as March 1864, Union 
vessels were still chasing blockade runners.19 This is the significance of Fort 
McAllister. Militarily, the fort was not important in the strategic sense. The amount 
of supplies that passed under the protection of McAllister's guns was minuscule when 
compared to ports like Charleston or Wilmington. Tactically the fort was 
insignificant until the arrival of Sherman's army to the Savannah area. What made 
17McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 547. 
18Those cities were Wilmington North Carolina, Charleston South Carolina and 
Savannah Georgia. Although Jacksonville Florida had the potential to become an 
important port, this potential never materialized. The Chesapeake Bay was also an 
important area for imports, although it was one of the first areas to be closed by the 
blockade. 
19The CSS Swift was chased without capture on 9 February, 1864, and the CSS 
Persis was unsuccessfully pursued on 15 March, 1864. 
13 
Savannah important was not its tangible contributions like imports of medicine and 
military hardware, but its intangible contributions. The city served a political and 
symbolic purpose by remaining open. Politically, Savannah served as a link to 
European nations. The city became a symbol of resistance for the people of Georgia, 
and with the arrival of each blockade runner came new hope that the Confederacy 
might survive. 
II: 
Weapons, Ammunition and Defilementl 
The nature, availability and use of artillery during the 19th century determined 
a fort's construction, defense and destruction. Growth in the field of artillery was 
slow at the time work began on Fort Pulaski in 1828. However, starting in the 1840s 
advances in gunpowder, projectiles and metallurgy significantly increased the power 
of artillery, thus reversing the traditional advantage of masonry forts over armies. 
Although the tools of war changed, the tactics followed for reducing permanent works 
remained the same. 
Most of the advances made during the 1840s and 1850s in the field of artillery 
were by men working with private industries or on their own accord without 
government financing. No official system existed for the lateral dissemination of 
information except through irregularly updated manuals. Officers, both active duty 
and militia, read manuals written by men like Professors Dennis Hart Mahan, Henry 
Wager Halleck and Lieutenant John Gibbon in order to remain up-to-date on the latest 
technological and tactical changes. 2 
1 All weapons mentioned refer to artillery in the U. S. arsenal. 
2Dennis Hart Mahan, Summary of the Course of Permanent Fortification and the 
Attack and Defense of Permanent Works. for the Use of the Cadets of the United States 
Military Academy (Charleston, S.C.: Steam Power Press of Evans & Cogswell) 1862; 
Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science; and Lieutenant John Gibbon, The 
14 
15 
SMOOTHBORE WEAPONS3 
Each group of weapons was classified by use: seacoast, garrison (called siege 
if used to reduce a fort) or field. The types of artillery included guns, howitzers, 
Columbiads and mortars.4 Guns were the most powerful weapons because of their 
mission: to batter down obstacles. Guns had short barrels, large calibers and were 
employed as direct fire weapons with low trajectories. Guns were named after the 
weight of the shot fired, such as a twelve-pounder or twenty-four-pounder gun. The 
largest weapon held by the U.S. Army during the 1850s was the forty-two pounder 
seacoast gun. Smaller garrison guns were frequently used to supplement the 
armament of seacoast works to save money. 
Howitzers fired hollowed projectiles against troops and could be used to set 
fire to ships and towns. Howitzers were named by weight of the projectile for 
smaller calibers or the diameter of the barrel for larger calibers. They could 
effectively tear down fragments of masonry walls by ricocheting rounds. 5 Garrisons 
Artillerist's Manual. Compiled from Various Sources. and Adapted to the Service of the 
United States (Glendale, New York: Benchmark Publishing Company, Inc.) originally 
published in 1860. 
3Por actual ranges of all smoothbores, see Appendix B. 
4U.S. Army, The Ordnance Manual for the Use of the Officers of the United 
States Army, 2nd edition (Richmond VA: West and Johnson, 1861) appendix. 
5Warren Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War (Charleston, S.C.: 
The Battery Press, 1984) 52. 
16 
often kept a few field howitzers available, for during an attack they could be rolled 
from undercover to repel an assault. 6 
The Columbiad was an American invention, designed and created by Colonel 
George Bomford in 1811. Columbiads first saw service during the War of 1812 and 
were considered ideal for defending channels due to the larger caliber, long range and 
high trajectory. The original versions were iron fifty-pounders that only fired solid 
shot.7 Sometime before the 1850s, Columbiads were redesigned to combine the long 
barrel of the gun with the large bore of the howitzer. This made them an unusual 
creature capable of firing both solid shot and shell. Columbiads quickly became 
favorites among artillerymen after the weapons were reinstated in the 1850s.8 
Mortars used the momentum of the falling shot to create damage. They were 
short chambered pieces that fired projectiles at great elevations. The range was 
limited and the accuracy was unpredictable, but they did cause massive damage when 
they struck a target. Mortars were designed to crush magazines, bombproofs and 
disrupt communications within a structure. They were grouped into heavy (or 
seacoast), light and stone mortars.9 Stone mortars had thirteen-inch diameters and 
6Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual, 45, 66-67. 
7Halleck, Military Art and Science, 280 fn. 
8Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual, 66-67, 71-72. 
9There were two other mortars, the Coehom and Ervouette, but neither saw field 
service with the U. S. Army. 
17 
were used to clear rubble from a breached wall by pulverizing the debris. Clearing 
the rubble gave an advance party enough room to storm the work. 10 
RIFLED WEAPONS 
Experiments with weaponry during the 1840s and 1850s included the rifling of 
all types of artillery. Since the primary weapons of armies were guns, most of the 
pieces rifled were guns. Projectiles from smoothbores battered targets by kinetic 
energy, or brute force. Because of the power imparted to a projectile by rifling, the 
shot burrowed into a target and either weakened or destroyed it by causing spider 
cracks throughout the target area. The number of grooves or the amount of spiraling 
varied from rifle to rifle and became the defining characteristic for a particular 
weapon's manufacturer. 
The manufacturing process caused limitations on the size and styles of 
weapons (like breech loading and rifling) until the 1860s. The casting of cannons had 
remained constant for centuries with little real improvement until the 1850s, when 
Captain T. J. Rodman of the U.S. Ordnance Corps developed a method for casting 
artillery on a hollow core. The "hollow core" method greatly extended a weapon's 
longevity and safety. 11 
lOGibbon, The Artillerist's Manual, 68-69. 
llThe process involved casting a gun on a hollowed core while running cool water 
through it. The metal cooled from the inside out causing the strain of the metal to form 
toward the inside, thus increasing the strength. Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual, 93-96. 
18 
Experiments in the United States and Europe resulted in many prototypes for 
rifled artillery, but three types of American rifles had become practical and acceptable 
by the time Fort Pulaski came under attack: Dahlgren, Parrott and Brooke. Admiral 
John Dahlgren (USN) designed several rifled howitzers and iron guns for use aboard 
ship. John Parrott designed and produced the most popular and economical rifle of 
the Civil war12. John Mercer Brooke created the Confederate version of the Parrott. 13 
Due to limited resources the Confederacy could not mass produce these weapons. 14 
Another "rifled" weapon in use, the James rifle, was not a rifle but rather a 
method of rifling. General Charles Tillinghast James developed a method for 
converting smoothbores into rifles during the 1850s. 15 Due to the nature of the 
rifling, the weapons could only use a special projectile called the James projectile. 
Rifling smoothbores allowed them to fire projectiles that weighed twice as much as 
smoothbore rounds. This was due to the rifled rounds being elongated instead of 
spherical in shape. Thus 32-pounders became 64-pounders and 42 pounders became 
84-pounders. James' rifling method was the first widely used by the U.S. military; as 
a result all rifled smoothbores were often referred to (inaccurately) as James rifles. 16 
12Parrotts were durable and inexpensive (slightly more than smoothbores). These 
two reasons made Parrotts attractive to the US government despite safety problems and 
mediocre performance. 
13The durability of Brookes and the distinction of being the only "home grown" 
rifle made them very popular among Southern forces. 
14Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War, 109-110, 127-128. 
15General James did invent one rifle, a fourteen-pounder. 
16Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War, 19, 300 
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Great Britain led the way in rifle experimentation and production. By 1860 
four types of British rifles were manufactured in substantial numbers: the Armstrong, 
Blakely, Whitworth and Clay. The reliability and accuracy of the first three weapons 
made them very attractive to artillerymen who had the opportunity to use them. The 
only British weapons used at or against either fort were two Blakelys emplaced at 
Pulaski. 
PROJECTILES 
Projectiles available during the 19th century were classified as either shot or 
hollow shot (shell). Shot was a solid projectile made of iron and named by weight. 
The spherical shape produced the greatest accuracy in smoothbores because as it 
rotated the same amount of surface area was always facing forward. An additional 
benefit included little deflection when hitting an object.17 Other types of shot 
available included bar, canister, chain and grape18. Although phased out by canister, 
the name "grape shot" was often used interchangeably with the name "canister 
shot. "19 
Hollowed shots were projectiles filled with powder designed to break apart 
with the explosion of the internal powder or upon impact with a target. They were 
17Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual, 155-156. 
18Still available, quilted grape had been phased out in preference to the economy 
of the stand of grape by the 1860s. Quilted grape and bar shot were inaccurate due to 
the rotary motion of the shot, but severe damage could result if either hit a ship's rigging 
or mast. 
19Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual, 160. 
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named by weight for smaller calibers or by inches for larger weapons. Shells were 
designed to kill troops, set fires and destroy light structures. Due to their lighter 
weight, shells had less accuracy and shorter ranges than shot. A shell's ability to 
cover a larger area offset these deficiencies. Three types of shell used in forts were 
spherical case (also known as shrapnel), carcass and grenades. 2o 
DEFILEMENT 
Professors Dennis Hart Mahan and Henry Wager Halleck became the two 
most prominent American military thinkers during the 1840s and 1850s. Both served 
as officers in the U.S. Army and taught engineering and military tactics at the United 
States Military Academy in West Point, New York. As instructors and writers these 
two men had a significant impact upon the future military leaders of the Civil War. 
Both wrote books discussing tactics, including how to defile permanent works. 
Their writings reiterated the purpose of coastal defenses as found in the 
Bernard report. They outlined three standard methods of taking permanent coastal 
works: maritime attack, siege or land assault. Each method had advantages and 
disadvantages, and the choice of method depended on the terrain around the fort, the 
size and quality of the work, the size and quality of the garrison and the attacking 
force, the resources of both, the possibility of reinforcements and the time schedule of 
the attacking army. 
20Shrapnel was named after its inventor, British Lieutenant Shrapnel. Information 
regarding shells is found in Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual, 163-166. See glossary for 
description of each shell. 
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The advantages of attacking by sea included the economy of men and the 
element of surprise. Gun for gun, ships required fewer men to operate and support 
than an army. However, as a general rule land batteries were superior to ship 
batteries. Seacoast fortifications provided protection for both the guns and crews. In 
casemate guns only the protruding muzzle was exposed. Aboard vessels the ship's 
planks offered some protection, but often this "protection" became deadly: when a 42-
pound solid shot slammed into the side of a ship, splinters from the planks could 
become deadly projectiles. The ratio of exposure to enemy fire for a gun crew in a 
permanent work compared to a similar gun crew aboard the deck of a ship was 
estimated at 1:20.21 
Ships had a greater critical factor than forts. The only way to cripple a fort 
was to destroy most of its guns facing the water or destroy its magazine. A ship had 
four areas, which if damaged severely, would cripple the vessel: crew, sails/riggings, 
rudder, and water line. Ricochets proved to be a menace to ships as well. If a hot 
projectile fell short it could bounce on the water and still hit its target with 
considerable force. Mortars constituted the greatest threat against ships. If a round 
fell through a ship it would sink within minutes. 22 
The most important factor for a land battery's superiority was the accuracy 
and range of the weapons. Land based weapons had stable platforms; ships did not. 
The only compensations needed when firing from a fort were the few feet of 
21Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science, 163. 
22ibid. 
22 
horizontal and vertical movement of the target. Cannons aboard ships constantly 
moved up and down. A few degrees off at the origin of fire magnified itself 
considerably after several hundred yards. The only way to compensate was to move 
closer to the fort, thus becoming a better target. It was not uncommon to overshoot 
an objective completely. For example, when French ships bombarded the castle at St. 
Juan d'Ulloa in 1838, approximately 2,000 yards distance lay between the ships and 
castle. Of the 8,250 rounds fired by the fleet only about three hundred hit the fort. 
The remainder overshot. To successfully breach masonry or stone walls required the 
smoothbore weapons to be within one thousand yards. The damage to ships was 
much greater than the damage to masonry walls at that range. 23 
Defensive works had greater concentration of firepower. Arms of sailing 
vessels were distributed evenly on either side; only half the guns could focus on a 
target at anyone time. Not only could garrison guns shoot with better accuracy at 
longer ranges, most of them were mounted toward the sea. The disadvantages of 
using the navy led to joint operations with the army. A good example of this was the 
final campaign against Fort Fisher, North Carolina on 23 December, 1864. In this 
campaign the navy was used to bombard the fort prior to the land assault. 24 
As an engineer Gillmore knew the advantages permanent works had over naval 
vessels. This is why he chose to attack Fort Pulaski from land batteries instead of 
23ibid., 189-191. 
24Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, 2nd 
edition (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994) 77-78. 
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attempting an attack by warships. Union forces attacking Fort McAllister had no 
choice but to attack from water; swampland and thick underbrush prevented Federal 
forces from building land batteries. The difference in vulnerability and fire control 
explains, in part, why McAllister was able to inflict more damage to its attackers than 
it received while using considerably less ammunition. 
The last method used to defile a permanent work was a siege and/or land 
assault. The purpose of a siege was to starve the garrison into submission. Sieges 
were the safest way for an army to take a permanent work and allowed full use of the 
captured fort with minimum reconstruction. Unfortunately sieges took from several 
weeks to several months. As wars modernized armies could not afford to wait long 
periods of time for a garrison to fall. Sieges evolved into a way of reducing the 
garrison's morale and will to fight prior to an assault. 
The standard method taught at West Point for assailing fortifications divided 
the assault into three stages: the investment, opening of the trenches and reduction of 
the work25 • The investment included all reconnaissance, surveillance and analysis of 
the information gathered. Investments took from a few hours to a few days. The 
engineer's job included determining the shape, size, age, armament and layout of both 
the fort and the garrison. He had to pinpoint exterior and adjacent defensive works, 
fields of fire, dead angles and caliber of weapons. 26 
25Mahan, Summary of the Course of Permanent Fortification, 319. 
26Gibbon, The Artillerist Manual, 433-434, 439-441. 
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At the end of the surveillance the reconnaissance force isolated the work and 
its garrison while the main body arrived. 27 The "opening of the trenches" marked the 
official beginning of the second stage (see illustration #3, "Defilement of Permanent 
Works"). A line of circumvallation was dug around the fort. The attacking force 
built batteries along this line and emplaced its heaviest guns inside redoubts. 
Construction and emplacement of the batteries occurred during the night to prevent 
the garrison from knowing the exact location. Work was performed in strict 
observance of noise and light discipline. All weapons on the same parallel had to be 
emplaced on the same night and then commence firing at first light with the objective 
of silencing the enemy's guns. After the batteries were emplaced work began on the 
outer trench, or sap.28 
Small trenches (called boyaux) approximately six feet wide were dug from the 
line of circumvallation in a zig-zag manner to the outer parallel. This prevented 
enfilade fire by the enemy. Huge sap rollers covered the approach of the men 
digging the trench. 29 Once the boyaux reached the location of the next parallel the 
trench branched into a "T". Along each parallel redoubts were constructed for siege 
weapons. This routine was followed until all the parallels were complete. The first 
parallel lay approximately 600 yards from the most advanced portion of the main 
27Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual, 433. 
28Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War, 252. 
29Sap rollers were large gabions (woven brushwood baskets filled with dirt) 
stuffed with fascines, which preceded the men in the saps. 
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work, the second 300 yards and the last, sixty yards. As the range of weapons 
increased so did the distance of the initial parallels from the fort. 30 
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Construction of berms inside the third parallel allowed the besieging troops to 
use plunging fire to drive the defenders from the covered way. Breaching batteries 
located on the second and third parallels around salient points usually started to batter 
down the wall just prior to, or after the fort's covered way was abandoned. Another 
trench was dug around the front and sides of the covered way (referred to as 
"crowning the covered way"). Tradition called for the commanding general of the 
offensive forces to offer the garrison commander a chance to surrender just prior to 
the assault. 31 
This three-phase plan of attack on permanent works had been passed down to 
generations of cadets at West Point, with modifications to compensate for increased 
ranges and power of artillery pieces. At the outbreak of the American Civil War 
these tactics were still being taught by Professors like Halleck and Mahan. These 
tactics were being practiced by regular army officers like General Quincy A. 
Gillmore, who followed these steps when he attacked Fort Pulaski. Even the advice 
given by General Robert E. Lee to Colonel Olmstead during Lee's November 1861 
visit to Pulaski reflected the same tactics. 
30Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War, 253. 
31Ripley, 252-253. 
III: 
Let the Work Begin: The Construction 
of Forts Pulaski and McAllister 
Throughout the 19th century engineers sought ways to improve fortification 
defenses in an attempt to remain one step ahead of the technology and tactics used 
against such works. Unlike frontier forts, those located on the coast had a significant 
advantage over their primary threat: ships could not maintain parity until the late 19th 
century. Nations could afford to spend tremendous time and resources constructing 
permanent works because improvements in weaponry were more advantageous for 
forts than for vessels. The key to such works was permanence. Pulaski took 
eighteen years and over one million dollars to construct and had a projected life span 
of decades. By contrast, the key to earthen forts was expediency. Forts like 
McAllister were built within months and were expected to be abandoned within a year 
or two. 
SITE SELECTION AND FORT DESIGN 
The ideal location for a seacoast fort was at the mouth of a harbor or river, 
preferably on an island. Coastal sites allowed for earlier detection of a fleet and 
longer time to track its direction of travel. An island fort, like Pulaski, provided 
safety against land assault. 
27 
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The foundation became the most important technical consideration for the 
construction of forts, especially for multi-tier works. The cost of the foundation 
could easily constitute the largest single expenditure for a fort, excluding its 
armament. 1 If a viable threat from land existed, then the walls had to be arranged to 
provide flanking and supporting fire along all parts. This allowed more protection for 
the defenders and permitted other parts of the fort to defend a breached wall. 
Because the threat to seacoast works was from the sea and not land, most seacoast 
forts were designed as polygonal shaped. 
The polygonal system took a variety of shapes including star and pentagon-
shaped forts. These designs were simple to build and had a large internal space for 
troops. They did not allow for secondary defenses inside or outside of the fort, with 
the exception of a moat, and often incorporated the magazines into the walls of the 
structure. The magazines, usually located on the same wall as the sallyport, had a 
demilune to provide protection against a direct attack. 2 Because the strength of the 
fort was determined by the number of guns that could be brought to bear on a target, 
coastal forts were usually multi-tier structures. 
IGeneral LeLouterel, Manual of Military Reconnaissance. Temporary Fortification 
and Partisan Warfare. for Officers of Infantry and Cavalry, translated by John M. 
Richardson, (McPherson & Co: Atlanta Ga, 1862) 31, 42-43. 
2Mahan, Summary of the Course of Permanent Fortification, 71-75, 173-175. 
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FORT CONSTRUCTION 
Most of the time involved in constructing forts went into building the main 
work (see illustration #4A, "Typical Fort Cross Section," and illustration #4B, 
"Typical Fort Schematic"). Demilunes provided safe havens for troops preparing to 
depart the work and served to protect the fort's entrance and main magazines. The 
primary threat to the demilune was an assault, so its armament usually consisted of 
field weapons and a few heavier pieces to attack the enemy's siege cannons. The 
covered way, actually part of the demilune, served as a protected position for infantry 
along the rim of the demilune. Many forts had detached works, which consisted 
mainly of batteries that supplemented a fort's firepower. Their purpose was to keep 
ships further away from the main work. Batteries were often included in the design 
of a fort because the cost was low. 
Permanent works, by deflnition, had to be constructed of durable materials like 
brick or stone. They were the two permanent materials used to construct seacoast 
fortifications. The biggest advantage to brick was its availability. All large cities and 
many smaller ones had brick foundries. There had to be stone quarries in the region 
for construction with stone to be cost effective, so few U.S. coastal forts were built of 
stone. Military engineers and many officers, particularly artillerymen, knew that the 
time and cost of construction of earthen forts as well as repairs during combat were 
considerably less. But erosion of earthen works required increased maintenance and 
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this in tum increased long-term costs. An important stipulation to American coastal 
works was that they should be economical.3 
PULASKI'S PRELIMINARY CONSTRUCTION 
Bernard hand-picked Cockspur Island as the spot for the fort that would defend 
the mouth of the Savannah River. The island, situated off the elbow of Tybee Island, 
was sheltered from storms in the Atlantic, yet commanded the entrance to the 
Savannah River. Troops located in the lighthouse on Tybee Island could provide 
early warning of enemy ships. What made Cockspur the ideal choice was its defense 
against attack by land, traditionally the weakest point in a seacoast work's defense. 
The nearest solid land capable of holding siege guns was on Tybee Island, 
approximately 1,700 yards away and thus beyond the effective range of available 
weapons. The surrounding river banks, primarily swampland, made siege practically 
impossible. An amphibious assault would be suicide, for landing craft would be 
within a few hundred yards of the fort's guns anywhere on the island. 
Congress approved the site in 1826 and appointed Major Samuel Babcock the 
engineer in charge. Babcock began to survey the island after its purchase in 1827. 
The initial survey revealed the ground would not support one tier, let alone the three-
tier fort Babcock had drew. He designed a series of pilings and grillage to provide 
3Dennis Hart Mahan, Summary of the Course of Permanent Fortification and the 
Attack and Defense of Permanent Works. for the Use of the Cadets of the United States 
Military Academy (Charleston, S.C.: Steam Power Press of Evans & Cogswell, 1862) 
35-40. 
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support and drainage for the foundation. Twenty-three hundred to twenty-five 
hundred pilings were eventually installed to support each wall.4 
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In 1831 Babcock retired due to poor health. His replacement, Lieutenant 
Kenneth F. Mansfield, performed his own survey and concluded that Babcock had 
erred in the initial survey. In September of 1831 Mansfield revised the plans by 
expanding the foundation and shifting the center mass of the fort a few degrees from 
its original axis. These significant changes increased the cost of construction and 
delayed completion of the fort, but were necessary to ensure that the fort be as 
soundly constructed as possible. Congressional and military leaders expected coastal 
works to remain active for decades.5 
Each year work stopped during the summer due to heat, humidity, dysentery 
and malaria. The time spent on construction of the fort averaged six to seven months 
out of each year. Even though personnel protected and maintained the property 
between work periods, some maintenance time was always required prior to 
resumption of work. 
Most of the work completed between 1832 and 1837 was on the foundation 
(constructing pilings, grillage, crosswalls and counter -arches). 6 The work produced 
nothing one could identify as a fort. Construction of the main wall (enceinte) began 
in 1837, ten years after the project began. Between 1837 and 1839, all embrasures 
4RG 77, Box 6, B665. 
5Rogers W. Young, "Board of Engineers", The Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. 
49,43. 
6Counter-arches provided additional support for the weight of the casemates. 
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and their arches were completed as well as the piers and internal walls. An extended 
work year enabled the main body of the fort to be completed by October 1839.7 
The finishing touches within the fort began in 1840. The work included 
completing the quarters, filling and leveling the parade ground, excavating, filling 
counter-arches for additional casemates and miscellaneous work on the gorge. As of 
30 September, 1842, approximately $739,000 had been spent on the construction of 
Pulaski, roughly twice the original estimate of $333,000. 8 Mansfield's replacement, 
Captain B. L. Alexander, resumed work 1 November, 1844 and finished all but 
miscellaneous items for the fort. The work performed in 1845 and 1846 included 
maintenance and minor construction such as carpentry, plastering, sloping and 
sodding. Anderson declared the fort officially completed in 1847.9 
The chart below gives the reader an idea of how massive a project coastal 
fortifications were. 
7RG 77, Box 105, M409. 
8RG 77, Box 107, M976 & RG 77, Box 108, M1058, Box 109, M1380. 
~G 77, Box 2, A573; Box 1, A474. 
35 
Yearly Expenditures for Fort Pulaski lO 
YEAR AMOUNT INFLATION RATE 1967 DOLLARS EST. EST. OF REQUESTED 
APPROP. (1828= $1.00) AMOUNT COMPLETION FOLLOWING 
TO YEAR 
COMPLETE 
1828 $ 25,000 $ 25,000.00 $ 75,757.00 + + $ 75,000 
1829 $ 75,000 $ 77,250.59 $234,375.00 + + $ 50,000 
1830 $ 5,000 $ 5,150.64 $ 15,625.00 + + $ 0 
1831 $ 0 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 + + $ 0 
1832 $ 46,000 $ 41,869.00 $153,333.34 + + $ 82,000 
1833 $ 75,000 $ 66,000.00 $258,260.69 + + $105,000 
1834 $ 82,000 $ 74,642.00 $273,333.34 + + $105,000 
1835 $ 0 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $395,948 + $155,000 
1836 $170,000 $170,000.00 $515,151.52 $331,711 1838 $239,000 
1837 $ 90,000 $ 92,727.28 $264,705.89 + 1840 $220,000 
1838 $100,000 $ 97,000.00 $312,500.00 $215,000 1841 $140,000 
1839 $ 15,000 $ 14,550.00 $ 46,875.00 $171,0000 1843 $ 43,767 
1840 $ 59,000 $ 53,690.00 $196,666.67 + + $ 43,767 
1841 $ 35,000 $ 32,900.00 $112,903.23 $129,0000 1844 $ 60,000 
1842 $ 0 $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 60,000 1845 $ 60,000 
1843 $ 60,000 $ 51,000.00 $214,285.72 $ 60,000 1846 $ 30,000 
1844 + $? $? + 1847 $ 25,000 
1845 + $? $? + 1848 $ 25000 
$ 837,000 $801,779.51" ($2,673,772.40) += not $1,458,534 
available 
With the possible exception of the foundation, construction of Pulaski was 
similar to that of any other seacoast fort in this period. The key characteristic for 
coastal forts was "permanence". It took four years to complete the grillage and 
foundation. The main work took another twelve years to finish. Every step of the 
project was designed and built to last. The concept for Pulaski, and other V. S. 
seacoast forts, originated from the lessons of history. Those lessons held that any 
threat to the V.S. would come from the sea, and that a permanent work was stronger 
l~G 77, Box 107, M976. 
llTotal spent was over $1 million. 
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than a water-based attacker. A land based siege was not considered possible because 
the distance between Pulaski and Tybee Island was greater than the ranges needed by 
smoothbores to breach walls as thick as Pulaski'sY Congress must have thought that 
Pulaski would serve for decades if they were willing to invest an enormous amount of 
money into Pulaski's construction. 
Yet Pulaski only lasted fifteen years and one battle. Until the mid-1850s the 
weapons available were not powerful enough to breach the walls of Pulaski from land 
emplacements at the range available to them. The builders' assumption was that if 
more powerful, accurate weapons with greater range were invented, forts would also 
have them. Therefore Pulaski would be able to destroy enemy batteries while they 
were under construction. The concept of Pulaski was well thought out and the 
principles applied were sound. However, as Pulaski's history during the Civil War 
indicates, the rate of change outstripped man's ability to fully comprehend the 
implications of such change. Rapid changes and the conditions of the war forced 
military engineers to experiment in response to the fluid conditions of the battlefield. 
Earthen forts were one response. 
EARTHEN FORTS 
The construction of an earthen fort was really quite simple. With a solid 
foundation an earthen battery or fort could be built just about anywhere. For 
hundreds of years military engineers had known the superiority of earth over stone 
12Pulaski's walls were 7 112 feet thick and 25 feet high. 
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and brick at absorbing solid shot. Other advantages of earthen forts included quick 
and easy construction, diversity of locations, low construction cost and availability of 
materials. Disadvantages included a relatively short life span, regular maintenance 
and susceptibility to land assault. 
Methods used to reduce erosion included sod and brick revetments. But sod 
required constant cutting and trimming during the growing season and brick or stone 
revetments would lose support and crack as the dirt settled. Earthen forts could only 
be constructed as one tier barbette batteries, thus effectively limiting the offensive 
firepower and exposing the gun crews to enemy fire. Earthen forts looked small, 
dirty, and somehow unprofessional. 13 
Construction of an earthen fort began with staking the location the walls and 
assembling a wooden box. A ramp was built allowing workers to walk to the top of 
the box to easily fill it. At periodic intervals the dirt was packed tight using logs 
similar to short telephone poles. This continued until the box was packed solid, then 
the workers disassembled the frame. Buildings, or bombproofs, were built in the 
same manner. Heavy reinforced timbers supported a light shell (not unlike a mine 
shaft), and then workers packed dirt around the structure. The most important part of 
construction was the gun platforms. After erection of the walls a terreplein was built 
to elevate the weapons ten to twenty feet above the surrounding area. The platforms 
were much more susceptible to decay than their counterparts in masonry works 
13George R. Collins, ed., Military Considerations in City Planning: Fortifications, 
based on works by Horst de la Croix (George Braziller Press: New York, 1972) 40-44. 
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because they rested on the ground. Additional features could be built as time 
allowed, such as traverses between the guns, hot shot furnaces and bomb shelters. 
Protective measures against land assault included ditches, palisades, abatis, and 
howitzers. 14 
Records pertaining to the construction of Fort McAllister are few. Initially it 
was just one of a series of temporary batteries constructed around Savannah to protect 
the city from attack by land and sea. Work apparently began sometime in the spring 
of 1861, for in August of that year an advertisement in a Savannah newspaper called 
for bids on supplying beef to a garrison at Genesis Point. IS The initial fort consisted 
of four guns protecting an obstruction across the Ogeechee river that prevented 
vessels from sailing upstream. The low threat level made construction of the fort a 
slow process. Impressed slaves used to build the fort were allowed to return to their 
masters periodically to work in the fields. 16 The official report of the first attack by a 
Union vessel in July 1863 described McAllister as an earthen battery. However, by 
November the captain of another Union vessel reported the earthen work as a fort. 17 
14Department of the Army and Fort Stewart Museum, Roger S. Durham, curator, 
"Staff Ride for Forts Pulaski and McAllister, Georgia" (Ft. Stewart: Hinesville, Ga, 
1994) 14-15. 
15 Savannah Daily Morning News, August 5, 1861. 
16Miscellaneous military orders calling for the impressment of Negroes can be 
found in the Charles J. Beatty Collection, Box 60, Georgia Historical Society, Savannah 
GA. 
!7United States Government, Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Navies in the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 9, 
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The chief engineer of the Savannah district was Captain John McCrady. He 
designed McAllister and supervised its construction and repairs after naval 
engagements. His assistant, Captain James McAlpin, was the actual engineer-in-
charge on site during construction. 18 McAllister was raised in sections as time and 
money allowed. For many months it remained little more than an earthen battery. It 
had an open rear and thus no defenses against land assault. In fact, the garrison was 
housed a mile down the road because there was no room in the vicinity of the battery. 
Outside the perimeter a clearing served as the bivouac site for a small contingent of 
troops on guard. If the fort came under naval attack, these guards would man as 
many guns as they could until the arrival of the remaining garrison. 19 
The erection of magazines, supply rooms and the hospital started after 
completion of the battery. Construction of traverses approximately 10-15 feet high 
offered flank protection against ricocheting balls and dismounting guns. 20 Although 
there is no record when McCrady made the decision to enclose McAllister, the 
available information suggests it was after the fall of Pulaski in April of 1862. The 
Confederates dug a dry ditch around the fort after raising the last wall. The ditch 
leveled off with the river on both sides of the fort and contained palisades designed to 
slow down an assaulting force. The remaining land defenses consisted of three field 
18R. Jarvis Cooke, "Sand and Grit: The Story of Fort McAllister; A Confederate 
Earthwork on the Great Ogeechee River, Genesis Point, Georgia", student technician 
paper, Fort Pulaski, GA, 1938) 10. 
190ral interview with Kenny Roberts, Park Ranger, Fort McAllister, Georgia on 
February 3, 1994. 
20Ft. Stewart Museum, "Staff Ride", 14-16. 
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pieces pointing toward the mainland and a cleared field of fire several hundred yards 
in depth. 
In July of 1862, McAllister had an armament of one 42-pounder and five 32-
pounder guns (all smoothbores). After the fall of Pulaski the Confederate military 
leadership re-invigorated McAllister's defenses by adding more weapons as they 
became available. McAllister became an important link in the ring of earthworks 
around Savannah by serving as the southern anchor for the city's defense. McAllister 
guarded one of two river routes to the city and would became the focus of several 
attacks by gunboats and monitors over the next year and a half.21 The U.S. Navy 
attacked McAllister nine separate times before giving up its attempts to destroy the 
fort. McAllister was the primary target in six of the attacks. The primary targets of 
the other three attacks were blockade runners and a reconnaissance boat. 22 As one 
young defender wrote to his mother "The Yanks can never take it [McAllister] so 
long as they knock at the front door. "23 
21port Jackson, a few miles above Pulaski, guarded the Savannah River channel. 
22Two attacks focused on the blockade runner C.S.S. Nashville (re-named 
Rattlesnake), the third attack focused on a small reconnaissance boat. 
23Goff Collection, Port McAllister file (Bryan County), Georgia State Archives, 
Atlanta GA. 
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IV: 
ALL FOR NAUGHT: THE REDUCTION 
OF FORTS PULASKI & McALLISTER 
Fort Pulaski fell on 11 April 1862 due to the devastating effects of rifled fire. 
Pulaski's commanding officer, Colonel William Olmstead, believed the fort would be 
virtually impregnable to an attack by the United States. General Robert E. Lee, 
commander of Atlantic seacoast defenses for the Confederacy, agreed. The 
commanding officer of the attacking force, General Quincy A. Gillmore, also thought 
the reduction of Pulaski would be nearly impossible, and he spent almost three 
months preparing. Most of that time was used to emplace smoothbore cannons. Yet 
the weapons that were emplaced first and actually breached the fort were rifled guns. 
Few people recognized that rifled weapons had made traditional masonry forts 
obsolete, even the officers who used them. Earthen forts like McAllister survived 
repeated attacks by the same types of weapons that destroyed Pulaski. 
PULASKI'S DEFENSE 
Georgia's Governor Joseph E. Brown ordered Fort Pulaski seized on 2 January 
1861. Although Georgia had not yet seceded from the Union, Brown did not want a 
"Fort Sumter experience"--that is, for the Union to have control of the state's primary 
harbor by occupying its most strategic fort. On 4 January, Olmstead arrived on 
43 
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Cockspur Island with a force consisting of the Savannah Volunteer Guards, the 
Oglethorpe Light Infantry and the Chatham Artillery. When Confederate forces took 
possession of Pulaski it was a pleasant, yet anti-climactic experience for the home 
guard units. They found the drawbridge down, the portcullis up and the caretaker 
waiting. In a very civil exchange Georgia troops peaceably occupied the fort.! 
Olmstead inventoried the fort's arsenal immediately upon occupation and 
started to strengthen its defenses. He found twenty naval 32-pounders with rusted 
cartridges, some powder and a few solid shots.2 Olmstead believed the fort would 
only fall to a land-based assault and prepared it accordingly. Confederate troops 
dredged the moat and salvaged exposed parts of a sunken vessel in Wall's Cut (see 
illustration #1). The ship's spars were expected to be thrown against Federal troops 
if they scaled the walls. Ship chains were cut into small sections and wrapped in bags 
to make home-made grape shot. 3 
Activity along the coast was at an all time high as Lee ordered Confederate 
forces inland to better defensive positions. When Port Royal, South Carolina, fell to 
the Union on 7 November 1861, Confederate authorities and coastal southern states 
knew it would serve as a base of operations for the Union blockade and perhaps as a 
!Olmstead, Fort Pulaski, 98-99. 
2Confederate forces added five 10" Columbiads, nine 8" Columbiads, three 43-
pounder guns, two Blakely rifled guns, one 24-pounder howitzer, two 12-pounder 
howitzer, two 12" mortar, three 10" sea-coast mortar and one 6-pounder gun. Gillmore, 
Siege and Reduction, 67. 
3Lilla Mills Hawes, ed., Collections of the Georgia Historical Society: The 
Memoirs of Charles H. Olmstead (The Georgia Historical Society: Savannah, 1964) 81, 
91. 
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base for land operations. The two closest and most likely targets were Savannah and 
Charleston. Both ports were the largest and most important for their respective 
states. Lee visited the Savannah area from November 1861 to January 1862 to 
inspect its defenses. 4 
Lee recommended building traverses between the barbette guns, digging 
ditches in the parade ground to stop stray rounds, and building blindages5 for the 
casemate doors. Tybee Island was one of the positions ordered evacuated by Lee, for 
Olmstead did not have sufficient troops to hold the island against an amphibious 
assault. As Lee pointed to Tybee Island 1,700 yards away, he remarked " Colonel, 
they will make it very warm for you with shells from that point but they cannot 
breach at that distance."6 This comment showed that an engineer as experienced as 
Lee did not recognize the changes brought by the widespread use of rifled artillery. 
Union General Quincy Gillmore received permission to attack Pulaski to gain 
experience before attacking the more formidable defenses of Charleston harbor. He 
made only a quick reconnaissance of the area because Pulaski had been a Federal fort 
less than a year earlier. He had no trouble getting blueprints for the structure, 
navigational maps for the Savannah River and Was saw Sound, as well as first hand 
information about the area from runaway slaves. After reconnaissance Gillmore 
decided to isolate Pulaski from its supply base in Savannah, reduce it by siege guns 
4ibid., 100-10 1. 
5Blindages were planks or poles emplaced at an angle to cover an opening. Dirt 
was then packed on top to absorb the impact of rounds. 
6ibid., 102. 
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on Tybee Island and then take the fort by amphibious assault. This would be a 
textbook operation for reducing a permanent work with one exception: his guns were 
at or beyond their maximum effective range (see illustration #6, "Destruction of Fort 
Pulaski"). 
The investment started during the middle of January 1862. Gillmore erected 
two batteries above the work, one at Venus Point (Jones Island) named Battery 
Vulcan and the other on Bird Island, named Battery Hamilton. These batteries were 
placed to cut the main supply route from Savannah to Pulaski and not designed to 
attack the fort. Federal engineer troops removed the obstacle blocking Wall's Cut, 
which was part of an inland water route between Savannah and Charleston. A joint 
force of soldiers and sailors built a causeway approximately 1,300 yards in length 
across the marshlands on Jones Island to Venus Point. Actual construction of the 
causeway and battery took place between the 1st and 12th of February. The weapons 
were emplaced and ready for action by daybreak on the 12th of February. 7 
The process that built the battery at Venus Point would be mirrored by the 
batteries erected on Tybee Island. All materials were brought to the site. Work 
started at dusk and halted prior to dawn, with the progress covered with grass and wet 
sand to hide evidence of construction. The weapons were rolled on fifteen foot long 
7Gillmore, Siege and Reduction, 15-20. 
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planks across the island. Pulleys and levers were constructed to raise the weapons 
that slid off the planks. 8 
The only solid land on which Union troops could build breaching batteries 
against Pulaski was Big Tybee Island. The first vessels with siege materials arrived 
on 21 February, 1862. The Federal armament was divided into eleven batteries for a 
total of thirty-six pieces, ten of which were rifled. 9 The range of the batteries from 
Pulaski was between 1,650 yards and 3,400 yards. 10 Seven of the eleven batteries 
were within range of Pulaski's guns and the five most advanced batteries had no 
natural cover or concealment. If guns emplaced on Tybee Island could hit Pulaski, 
then the guns in Pulaski could hit the batteries emplaced on Tybee Island. Gillmore 
therefore devised a plan to build his batteries without Pulaski's garrison detecting and 
destroying them. His men slowly built up the surrounding area during the night over 
a period of weeks until there was sufficient protection for work crews." No sudden 
change in the outline of the landscape could occur lest it arouse suspicion. After the 
cover and concealment had been completed, some of the more routine mechanical 
8ibid., 19-20. 
9fu.fles: two 84 pounder James, two 64 pounder James, one 48 pounder James, 
five Parrotts. Smoothbores: four 10" siege mortars, twelve 13" mortars, six 10" 
Columbiads, four 8" Columbiads. 
lOFor the name, weapons and approximate distance of each battery, see illustration 
6, "The Destruction of Fort Pulaski". 
"ibid., 19-20. 
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work in the battery areas, such as improving the platforms, could continue during the 
day12. 
The Confederates knew that Federal forces had occupied the island and could 
hear activities from their crews at night. Each morning Confederate sentries would 
scan the horizon in search for some evidence of where the Federals were working.13 
Olmstead never fired on Tybee Island during this time because he could never locate 
a target. He made the decision not to blindly expend rounds in the hope that he 
might hit a battery site. Instead, he decided to save his limited ammunition for the 
"big fight". 14 
During the following week Major General David Hunter, commander of Union 
forces for the Department of the South, and Brigadier General H. W. Benham, 
commander of Union forces for the Northern District, Department of the South, 
inspected the batteries around Pulaski. Both were pleased with what they saw. On 9 
April Gillmore issued General Order #17, his operation order for the reduction of 
Fort Pulaski. As was traditional, Hunter dispatched a messenger under a flag of truce 
at daybreak on the 10th of April requesting the unconditional surrender of the fort. 
Also following tradition Olmstead declined the request, responding that he was 
12Gillmore, Siege and Reduction, 25-26. 
13ibid., 26. 
14Hawes, Memoirs, 95. 
charged with defending the fort, not surrendering it. Approximately thirty minutes 
later Union batteries commenced firingY 
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The first battery started at 0815 and by 0930 all weapons had joined the 
barrage. Gillmore was impressed with the performance of his rifled guns; through his 
telescope he saw that the areas hit were "deep and effective," particularly on the 
southeast wall. By the end of the day it was evident to him that Pulaski's walls 
would be breached within a day or two. However, he was very disappointed by the 
performance of the mortars. Gillmore estimated that only 1I1Oth of the mortar rounds 
were landing within the structure, and those created no damage of significance. "We 
may therefore assume, that mortars are unreliable for the reduction of a good 
casemated work of small area, like most of our sea-coast fortifications. ,,16 The same 
mortars would have to be used just prior to an assault, which he still believed would 
be necessary. Gillmore's training had instilled in him the traditional steps for 
reduction of a permanent work. He still planned to carry out those steps even though 
the rifled weapon's potential was unfolding in front of him. 17 
Olmstead directed Pulaski's weapons toward the closest Union batteries but 
was disadvantaged from the start. His men had little experience aiming and firing the 
heavy ordnance, and only twenty weapons could be trained on the Union batteries due 
to the divided locations on the northeast and southeast walls. Of the twenty weapons, 
15Gillmore, Siege and Reduction, 27, 32. 
16ibid., 52. 
17ibid., 33-35. 
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only fifteen were direct fire weapons including one Blakely rifle. Once the 
bombardment started there was no way to relocate the other weapons inside the fort. 
On the evening of the 10th Olmstead made an inspection of the southeast wall's 
breach and realized the fort would fall the next day. 
Union forces continued harassment fire throughout the night with three mortars 
and a Parrott rifle. On the morning of the 11th all batteries resumed firing. Most of 
the Federal weapons specifically targeted the south-southeast angle of the fort with the 
goal of breaching the wall and striking the north magazine. 18 As the morning 
progressed the breach grew larger until shots slammed into the blindages and bounced 
around the parade field. Sometime after 1300 a round exploded in the passageway of 
the north magazine creating a great deal of fire and smoke. Miraculously the 
magazine did not explode, for had it done so the fort would have been effectively 
destroyed. Confederate troops were afraid to retrieve munitions for fear that another 
round might land in the magazine. Olmstead realized that continued resistance had no 
benefits and would only lead to unnecessary loss of life. Shortly after 1400 Fort 
Pulaski's commanding officer signaled for surrender. 19 
In his memoirs Olmstead noted that he feared his military career was over. 
He knew Pulaski's garrison did all they could to defend the fort, and also knew that 
18Gillmore, Siege and Reduction, 35-36. 
1901mstead, Fort Pulaski, 104. 
Hawes, Memoirs, 98-99. 
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Pulaski was obsolete. His concern was that no one else would recognize the fact. 20 
Olmstead's conclusions were the same as Gillmore's: rifled guns had far greater 
range, accuracy and power than smoothbores. 21 The key to defending Pulaski, or any 
fort, lay in distance. The defending work had to have weapons with equal or greater 
range than the enemy. 22 Although Federal ships were present during the 
bombardment, none participated. Land based weapons destroyed Pulaski. In 
retrospect, its fate was sealed with the fall of Tybee Island, an island Confederate 
authorities evacuated because they considered it of little threat. 23 
Using Pulaski as a case study primarily serves to illustrate the effectiveness of 
rifled artillery against masonry walls. Unfortunately, the battle does not adequately 
show how well earth performed against rifled weapons because Pulaski only had one 
rifled gun in use against the Federal batteries. Olmstead specifically mentioned using 
his Blakely against the Union battery closest to the Fort (either Battery McClellan or 
Sigel) in an attempt to silence it.24 According to Gillmore, the only damage to his 
2°Pulaski's garrison was sent to Governor's Island, New York, where the officers 
were kept in Fort Columbus and the men in Castle Williams. Olmstead was exchanged 
in the fall of 1862, after which he was assigned to military service in the Western theater 
and eventually transferred to Virginia. Olmstead, Fort Pulaski, 105. 
21Hawes, Memoirs, 99. 
22Pulaski only had one weapon, a Blakely, that was capable of effectively reaching 
Federal Batteries. 
23Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Jones Jr., A Historical Sketch of the Chatham 
Artillery during the Confederate Struggle for Independence (Albany, NY: Joel Munsell 
Company, 1867) 68, 82-83. Book found at the GA Historical Society. 
24Hawes, Memoirs, 98. 
artillery was to four Columbiads that were dismounted by their own recoil. Three 
were remounted and continued in the bombardment. Pulaski's weapons did no 
damage to Federal earthen batteries. 
The destruction of Pulaski was hailed as a grand experiment by political and 
military leaders who later described Gillmore as a brilliant engineer. Although the 
method used was the standard taught at the U.S. Military Academy, what made the 
attack "a grand experiment" was the distance between the two sides. At an average 
range of 1,650 yards for the closest batteries, Gillmore should not have been able to 
breach Pulaski's walls, in theory. In his report Gillmore referenced two European 
experiments comparing the performance of rifles to smoothbores. But this was the 
first time the two types of weapons were used together in combat and at such 
distances. 25 Gillmore was quick to realize this and documented the results. 
Gillmore proved the superiority of rifled guns by computing the number of 
pounds of metal required to breach a linear foot of masonry wall. Smoothbores 
needed approximately 2,544 pounds of iron per linear foot, whereas rifles needed 
2,139 pounds per linear foot to breach Pulaski's wall. 26 Gillmore also documented 
the penetrating power of rifles and smoothbores, as shown in the following chart. 
25For more details, read Gillmore's Siege and Reduction, sections 121-127. 
26Gillmore, Siege and Reduction, 47-49. 
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KIND OF GUN I DISTANCE I KIND & WT. PRO] I ELEV I CHRG I PENETR 
OLD 42# RIFLE 1650 YDS JAMES' 84# SOLID 4.25 8# 26" 
" 32# 64# 4.00 6# 20" 
" 24# 1670 48# 4.50 5# 19" 
PARROT RIFLE PARROTT 30# " 4.50 3.5# 18" 
10" SMOOTHBORE 1740 128# SOLID, RD. 4.50 20# 13" 
COLUMBIAD 
8" SMOOTHBORE 68# 5.00 10# 11" 
COLUMBIAD 
The above chart shows how much deeper rifled rounds penetrated than smoothbore 
rounds. In addition, rifle shells created a broader crater due to their bursting effect. 
Rifles were more accurate, caused more damage, used less powder, shot farther and 
were lighter than smoothbores. Gillmore's attack on Pulaski demonstrated not only 
the obsolescence of masonry forts but of smoothbore weapons as well. 
This success so fully demonstrates the power and effectiveness of 
rifled cannon, for breaching at long distances, -at distances indeed 
hitherto untried, and considered altogether impracticable, thus opening 
a new era in the use of this most valuable, and comparatively unknown 
arm of service. 27 
After bombardment began, Olmstead was in no position to send a report to his 
superiors. The only official report Confederate officials could have read was 
Gillmore's report after its publication several months later. Therefore Confederate 
engineers had no proof that masonry forts were obsolete when earthen forts like 
McAllister were started or expanded. 
27ibid., 7. 
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McALLISTER 
McAllister's mission was to protect blockade runners and the pilings that 
blocked part of the Ogeechee River. Union ships targeted the forts on six separate 
occasions. 28 The number of ships attacking the fort varied between one and five. 
Federal vessels were armed with a mix of smoothbore and rifled weapons. Of 
particular importance are the attacks on 27 January, 1 February and 1 March 1863. 
55 
Five Union ships participated in the 27 January attack, one of which was 
armed with a 15" Dahlgren smoothbore, the largest gun in the Navy's arsenal. This 
attack was the first time a gun this size was used against an earthen fort. After four 
hours of firing the Federal force withdrew, having inflicted no permanent damage to 
the fort. 29 Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont, Commander of South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron, learned from the captains of the attacking vessels that the fort 
was impervious to solid shot. He also learned that shells disrupted the earth parapets 
fairly well, but with the help of slaves the garrison repaired most of the damage 
overnight. The only hope of navigating up the Ogeechee River in pursuit of blockade 
runners would be to steam quickly past the fort, which was deemed impossible due to 
the pilings and torpedoes (sea mines). 30 
A six hour attack against the fort on 1 February showed a change in tactics 
used by the naval crews. They utilized smaller caliber weapons which caused more 
28For a synopsis of each naval attack on Fort McAllister, see Appendix C. 
290R (Navy), series I, vol. 13, 547-5488. 
30ibid., 626-628. 
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damage and permitted a rapid rate of fire. Much damage was done to the earthen 
parapets and one gun was dismounted, but the garrison was able to repair the damage 
overnight. 31 
The navy thought they might be able to destroy the fort if only they could 
prevent the walls from being repaired during the night. Severe damage was inflicted 
upon the fort during the three hour attack on 1 March. 32 Mortar boats continued to 
fire periodically throughout the night, forcing Captain Anderson to use soldiers to 
repair the damage instead of slaves. The next morning when the Federal Navy closed 
in to resume its attack, it saw much of the damage repaired and the fort ready for 
action. The mission commander decided another attack would be useless and the 
Federal vessels withdrew to Ossabaw Sound. 
The primary purpose of this attack, according to Admiral DuPont, was to test 
modifications on different monitors and gunboats for use against Charleston harbor 
defenses. DuPont also came to the conclusion that no more attacks should be made 
on McAllister unless the mines and obstructions could be removed. In a letter to 
U.S. Secretary of War Giddeon Welles, DuPont wrote that he was withdrawing his 
vessels from the Ogeechee River and maintaining a blockade at its mouth. Due to the 
numerous interconnected waterways leading to McAllister from the Atlantic Ocean, 
there was no way to impose a total blockade on Savannah without taking the fort. 
31ibid., 632-633, 730-733. 
32The vessels were the USS Passaic, Patapsco, C.P. Williams, Para, and Norfolk 
Packet. The largest weapon aboard were 15" Dahlgren guns and a 150-pounder Parrot. 
Unless the river harbored another blockade runner, DuPont wrote, there was no 
purpose in taking McAllisterY Until the end of the following year, most of the 
Federal action involved either probing along Savannah's rivers and exchanging fire 
with Confederate defenders, or chasing blockade runners. 
McALLISTER'S CAPTURE 
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In December of 1864 Sherman's troops arrived from Atlanta. As Sherman 
approached the city of Savannah he decided to swing south to take the shorter distance 
to the sea. It was vital that he make contact with supply vessels, for the country 
around Savannah could not provide enough food and forage for Union forces. 
Sherman's plan called for using the Ogeechee River to receive supplies, but Fort 
McAllister prevented Union vessels from using the river. 
Major George W. Anderson commanded the garrison of 230 troops at 
McAllister, which consisted of the Emmitt Rifles, Clinch's Georgia's Light Artillery 
Battery, and Companies D and E of the First Regiment of Georgia Reserves. 
Anderson received reports from Lieutenant General William J. Hardee, commander of 
Savannah's defenses, that Sherman's force was approaching the city. Hardee's 
superior in Charleston, General P. G. T. Beauregard, ordered him not to allow 
Confederate forces to be trapped within Savannah. Hardee made plans to slowly 
withdraw the main garrison toward South Carolina and in the process he withdrew the 
cavalry supporting McAllister, leaving the fort isolated. Hardee ordered Anderson to 
330R (Navy), series I, vol. 13, 716. 
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delay the Union force as long as he could, buying time for the effective evacuation of 
Savannah. With 230 men Anderson to stiffened the resistance of McAllister. 34 
He felt confident of surviving an attack from the sea, for the fort had proved 
its worthiness many times in the past. A simultaneous land and sea attack would 
probably not occur because of the risk of Union gunboats hitting their own men by 
overshooting the fort. This left assault by land as the only practical alternative to 
Sherman. He ordered Major General Oliver O. Howard, his right wing commander, 
to take McAllister by force. 35 
Because McAllister was located on a peninsula there existed only one avenue 
of approach by land (see illustration UVII, "Assault on Fort McAllister). The 
surrounding terrain was small, covered with streams and swamps. The garrison felled 
trees to create abatis and further cleared the surrounding area. The palisades in the 
ditch were never extended into the water line, but stopped short of it at high tide; 
Anderson should have extended them well into the water, for during the assault the 
first Federal troops to enter the fort did so by outflanking the palisades on the river 
front. Anderson spiked the 10" mortar located outside of the fort. The most 
important improvement by Anderson was laying land mines around the fort's 
perimeter and along the main avenue of approach to Genesis Point. 36 
34Savannah Press, "Siege of Savannah" by George W. Anderson (commander of 
Fort McAllister), Friday, August 10, 1906. 
35William R. Scaife, The March to the Sea (New York: Washington Printing 
Company, 1989) 75-76. 
360R (Army), series I, vol. 44, 109-113. 
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On the afternoon of the 12th Federal forces numbering 3,500-4,000 troops 
under the command of Brigadier General William B. Hazen approached McAllister 
from the south and found King's bridge destroyed. 37 Engineer troops quickly rebuilt 
it and Federal forces pressed forward on the following morning. A Confederate 
picket named Thomas Mills was captured and revealed vital information concerning 
the fort's defenses. In addition to troop strength and armament, he informed Union 
forces of the land mines emplaced along the main avenues of approach. 38 
Removing the mines took most of the morning but soon afterwards Hazen 
deployed his men in a semi-circle from the river north of the fort to the same river 
south of the fort. Several hours were spent deploying Federal troops. During this 
time the overwhelming number of Federal skirmishers prevented the garrison from 
manning its guns. Six out of eight members of one crew were either killed or 
wounded by skirmishers. At approximately 1700 on the 13th of December Union 
forces stormed McAllister. 39 Most of the Union casualties were inflicted by land 
37The Federal force consisted of elements of the 2nd Division of the XV Corps. 
The assaulting force for 1st Brigade: 116th Illinois, 6th Missouri and 30th Ohio. 
Reserve force: 55th Illinois, 127th Illinois and the 57th Ohio. The assaulting 
force for 2nd Brigade: lllth Illinois, 47th Ohio and 54th Ohio. Reserve force: 83rd 
Indiana, 37th Ohio and 53rd Ohio. The assaulting force for 3rd Brigade: 48th Illinois, 
90th Illinois and 70th Ohio. Reserve Regiments: 15th Michigan, 27th Missouri, Battery 
H of the 1st Illinois and Battery H of the 1st Missouri. 
38Savannah Press, August 10, 1906. 
390R (Army), series I, vol. 44, 109-113. Savannah Press, August 10, 1906. 
mines. Official Union casualties were 24 killed and 110 wounded. Confederate 
casualties were 17 killed, 31 wounded. 40 
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The fight for McAllister was over before it began. The attack itself took about 
twenty minutes. The fort was surrounded by an overwhelming force which had the 
potential reinforcement of an entire army. The garrison had no hope of reinforcement 
or escape. Both Union and Confederate commanders noted in their reports that each 
of the garrison's defenders had to be physically overpowered and disarmed.41 Hazen 
had made no elaborate plans for McAllister's demise, no long-range reconnaissance or 
prolonged siege. Hazen had no need for such actions because of his superiority in 
numbers. McAllister was a temporary fort with limited armament and garrison. The 
planning, reconnaissance and assault was made en route and was based on four years 
of fighting rather than on textbook or classroom instruction. 
McAllister's mission was to prevent Union gunboats from approaching 
Savannah from the south and to protect blockade runners, a mission it accomplished. 
This petty little fort was supposed to be temporary, an ad-hoc structure built with the 
only materials available. Time and money were the driving factors in its 
construction. Yet McAllister survived the biggest and most powerful guns in the 
U.S. Navy's arsenal. The city of Savannah remained in Confederate hands until 
December 1864, even though Federal forces had lived in their back yard at Port 
Royal since November 1861 and at Pulaski since April 1862. 
4°OR (Army), series I, vol. 44, 109-113. 
41Savannah Press, August 10, 1906. OR (Army), series I, vol. 
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One reason Savannah did not fall earlier was the Union's preoccupation with 
Charleston. Another was the naval blockade imposed against it after the fall of 
Pulaski. Even though blockade runners still entered Savannah, they were limited in 
size due to the smaller waterways used. A third reason for Savannah's safety was its 
formidable defenses, both land and water. Two hundred twenty-nine cannons lined 
the roadways and waterways leading to Savannah. 42 Union forces could not take the 
city by water and did not have the manpower to spare to try to take it by land until 
the arrival of Sherman in the winter of 1864. Savannah remained symbolically 
important to the people of Georgia as long as it remained open. 
42Report dated 31 January 1865 from Admiral DuPont to Secretary Welles. OR 
(Navy), series one, vol. 16. 
Chapter V: 
What to Do? 
By the end of the Civil War, ample evidence existed proving masonry forts 
and smoothbore weapons were obsolete. Congressional leaders ignored the evidence 
and the recommendations of senior military officers, and opted to retain masonry forts 
as the nation's primary means of defense. Congressional leaders believed some 
undiscovered technological improvement would allow them to salvage America's third 
system of coastal defense. They recognized the rapid pace of technological change 
created by the war, and were concerned with spending large sums of money on new 
permanent works only to have those works negated within a few years by improved 
weaponry. Once again, as in 1816, economy was a major factor in deciding whether 
to retain, modernize or replace existing forts. 
The best place to start in trying to determine when people realized masonry 
works and smoothbores were obsolete is Gillmore's official report on the fall of Fort 
Pulaski, dated 30 April 1862. Congress also dealt with the state of America's water 
defenses and issued three reports dealing exclusively with the subject between the 
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years 1858-1873. These reports were dated 23 April 1862, 10 May 1862, and 7 May 
1870.1 
Gillmore wrote in his report: 
With heavy James or Parrott guns, the practicability of 
breaching the best-constructed brick scarp, at 2,300 to 2,500 yards with 
satisfactory rapidity, admits of very little doubt. Had we possessed our 
present knowledge of their power, previous to the bombardment of Fort 
Pulaski, the eight weeks of laborious preparation for its reduction, 
could have [been] curtailed to one week, as heavy mortars and 
columbiads would have been omitted from the armament of the 
batteries, as unsuitable for breaching at long ranges. It is also true 
beyond question, that the minimum distance, say from 900 to 1,000 
yards, at which land batteries have heretofore been considered 
practically harmless against exposed masonry, must be at least trebled, 
now that rifled guns have to be provided against. 2 
Although he never specifically stated that masonry works were obsolete, the 
evidence Gillmore presented in his report indicated he knew Confederate (and Union) 
masonry forts had outlived their usefulness. Apparently he was one of very few who 
recognized the fact. The House of Representatives issued "Permanent Fortifications" 
two weeks after Pulaski's fall, which discussed the future defense of America's 
harbors and coast.3 
1The Second Session of the 37th Congress issued a report titled "Permanent 
Fortifications and Seacoast Defense" (referred to as "Permanent Fortifications). The 
Second Session also issued a second report titled "Changes of material and Construction 
of Forts" (referred to as "Construction of Forts" The Second Session of the 41st 
Congress printed "Seacoast Defenses". These were the only three reports dealing with 
the state of coastal defenses between the years 1858-1873, as listed by the Congressional 
Series and Congressional Globe. 
2Gillmore, Siege and Reduction, 51-52. 
3House of Representatives, "Permanent Fortifications and Seacoast Defense", 2nd 
session of the 37th Congress, 1862. 
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"Pennanent Fortifications" first advised keeping pennanent works and looking 
for some way to strengthen their defenses against improved weaponry and ships. As 
Representative Frank P. Blair Jr. of the Committee on Military Affairs stated, the 
U.S. only needed works capable of resisting a surprise attack by the greatest 
immediate threat. If an enemy took time to prepare a large scale invasion, America 
would have time to prepare. The report suggested increasing the quantity and size of 
annament in coastal forts. It recommended improving naval yards and weapons 
foundries to allow for the quick building of ships and weapons during crises, and 
expanding the military academies to create a larger officer corps. "Pennanent 
Fortifications" pointed out that a sizable military of "quality would command respect 
from foreign nations, thus reducing the chance of war. The report recommended 
supplemental defenses for fortifications, such as floating batteries, land batteries and 
cables.4 
The primary purpose of "Pennanent Fortifications" appears to have been a 
recognition that America's coastal defense would have to be addressed in detail after 
the war. Blair stated unequivocally that since ironclad ships commanded by skilled 
captains could pass into protected harbors, improvements must be made to existing 
works. However, because the Confederacy posed no naval threat the U.S. had no 
need to change its defenses in the immediate future. 
House Executive Report "Changes of Material and Construction of Forts," 
dated 1 0 May 1862 dealt exclusively with the materials used to build and destroy 
4"Pennanent Fortifications". 
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masonry works. Brevet Brigadier-General Joseph Totten, Chief of Engineers, pointed 
out that the vessels present at Fort Pulaski's defeat were armed with the largest 
weapons available (15" smoothbore Columbiads) but did not participate in the attack. 
Totten reiterated the virtues of masonry forts: durability, economy and strength. He 
recommended keeping the current system of masonry forts, but either adding a dirt 
front or iron plating the casemates if they fell within range of potential land batteries. 
To quell worries about expense, Totten noted that a monitor class vessel armed with 
two 11" guns cost $285,000. A 15" Columbiad within an iron plated casemate only 
cost $20,000; therefore the u.s. could afford to buy and plate fourteen casemates for 
the price of one vessel of war. 
To offset the improved performance of vessels using armor and steam, Totten 
suggested adding a second tier of casemate guns to replace the barbette guns. 
Improved weaponry still benefitted forts more than ships, he claimed, and works 
could be plated with thicker armor than warships. Permanent works not only cost 
less to maintain, they did not wear out after twenty years of service as did naval 
vessels. Totten listed a few other reason for maintaining permanent works, but one 
can easily see that his reasons were the same as those given in the Bernard report. 
As of May 1862, America's top military engineer still recommended the retention of 
permanent works made of masonry. 5 
With the fall of the Confederacy in 1865, the Corps of Engineers resumed its 
search for a practical, cost-effective coastal defense. During the House discussion on 
5"Construction of Forts." 
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"Permanent Forts" in May of 1862, the formation of a board of engineers to study 
America's water defenses was approved. Congress charged the board to improve 
permanent works and find new ways to defend America's coast. 6 The board's 
findings were incorporated into House Executive Document titled "Seacoast 
Defenses. " 
The report echoed House Report "Permanent Fortifications," arguing that the 
United States should keep permanent works and look for ways to enhance their 
defense against improved weaponry. As of 1870, military and political leaders still 
did not believe that masonry forts were obsolete. They recognized that permanent 
works had problems, but thought those problems could be corrected. The report 
detailed two experiments in 1869, one at Fort Monroe and the other at Fort Delaware, 
that tested improvements in the defensive quality of forts. The engineers of the 
Monroe experiment applied the concept of ironclad ships to their target. If ships 
could be plated with iron, why not fort casemates? The outside walls of a casemate 
were lined with plates of metal in an attempt to deflect projectiles. The engineers of 
the Delaware experiment located plates of metal inside the walls to prevent projectiles 
from penetrating. Of the two experiments the Delaware fared better, but neither set 
of results was satisfactory. 7 Nevertheless, the board believed that American ingenuity 
would find a way to salvage permanent works and that research should continue until 
~his board was to consist of two army engineer officers, 1 ordnance officer, one 
artillery officer, 2 naval officers and two eminent civilians. Congressional Globe, set 
1145, serial 2107, page 2431, 29 May 1862. 
7House Executive Document #271, "Seacoast Defenses", 2nd session of the 41 st 
Congress, 1870. 
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a lasting solution was found. To add weight to this recommendation the board 
pointed out that European nations had taken the same course of action. Austria, 
France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia all had important harbors to protect. None 
showed any signs of building iron forts or abandoning their coastal forts even though, 
in the opinion of U.S. political and military leaders, Europe was on the verge of 
war.8 
"Seacoast Defenses" pointed out that European armies had already 
implemented improvements and changes based on Civil War experience. 
Smoothbores were eliminated from their arsenals and rifles were being made 
equivalent to 200 and 300-pounder Parrotts9. One measure suggested by the report 
was to replace all seacoast smoothbores with the largest caliber weapons available. 
Supplemental measures recommended in the report for harbor and channel defenses 
included building floating batteries, floating obstructions, harbor defense vessels, 
entanglements and torpedoes (sea mines). The latter three were effective yet 
inexpensive. Confederate forces were credited with having improved the quality and 
use of the sea mine. The report mentioned that the only vessels lost during the 
attacks on Mobile Bay and Fort Fisher were due to mines.lO 
8"Seacoast Defenses." 
9Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Jones Jr., "Military Lessons Inculcated on the 
Coast of Georgia During the Confederate War" (Augusta, GA: Chronicle Printing 
Establishment, 1883) 10. 
IO"Seacoast Defenses." 
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The board advised using barbette batteries with a carriage designed to allow 
guns to depress while loading. This would protect guns and their crews during their 
most vulnerable momentsY Even though Gillmore discouraged the use of mortars 
except against large targets, the board recommended creating a system of mortars to 
prevent the concentration of enemy troops which occurred during a landing. This 
would partially address the issue of vulnerability to land assault. Finally, the board 
suggested continuing the use of mines and non-permanent obstacles guarded by shore 
batteries of the heaviest artillery. 12 
General William T. Sherman, Commanding General of the U.S. Army, drew 
upon his years of field experience and placed his recommendations in the report. He 
advised the use of scattered earthen batteries with traverses between them. This 
"scattered battery" system was inexpensive to construct, was a proven method of 
defense against heavy weapons (both smoothbores and rifles) and would prevent the 
enemy from concentrating its firepower on one target. Earthen batteries' primary 
weakness lay in defense against land assault. Sherman's remedy was to protect them 
by one or more central works. Each fort would have an earthen glacis covering all 
masonry walls facing outward. He did agree on using mines to supplement a work's 
llThis idea was achieved during the Endicott period of defense. Carriages were 
manufactured that used the recoil of the gun to lower itself behind a wall. Lewis, 
Seacoast Fortifications, 76, 
12" Seacoast Defenses. " 
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defense. 13 Sherman's proposals were measures proven by the performances of 
McAllister and other earthen forts. 
However, Congress chose to disregard Sherman's recommendations and keep 
permanent works as America's first line of defense. Congress' decision to reject 
Sherman's recommendations should not come as a surprise, for several factors 
contributed to it. Despite the prestige he earned during the Civil War, Sherman was 
only one of several prominent men to make recommendations. His suggestions barely 
filled two pages. Although Sherman was the Commanding General of the Army, due 
to the nature of the army's organization he controlled only combat troops, and then 
only via their commanding generals. The bureau chiefs, such as the head of the 
Quartermaster and Ordnance department, controlled a sizable portion of U.S. Army in 
terms of men and materials, and reported directly to the Secretary of War. In short, 
Sherman's position was one of influence, not power. In addition, men with more 
expertise concerning coastal forts, like the Chief of Engineers, disagreed with 
Sherman. More than likely they would have carried more weight with Congressmen 
than Sherman, whose primary concerns were patrolling the Western frontier and 
maintaining pay and benefits for his soldiers and Civil War veterans. 14 
One might argue that Congress kept masonry forts for economic reasons. But 
the cost of research, development and implementation of improvements, not to 
mention the cost of maintenance, could not have been much less than implementing 
14J.D. Hittle, The Militarv Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg: 
Military Service Publishing Company, 1949) 178-179. 
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Sherman's ideas. How much did dirt cost? How much did wood to build frame 
boxes cost? Troops could have been used to dig and maintain batteries instead of 
performing fatigue duty. The army could have been kept at the same levels instead of 
being reduced in 1869 from 54,000 to 35,000, and reduced even further to 25,000 
shortly thereafter. 15 A proven solution, earthen forts, was available but not adopted. 
One might argue that the reason for the reduction in troops was caused by factors 
discussed in chapter one, such as a fear of large standing armies. However, an army 
of 54,000 troops out of a population of 38.56 million (.14%) can hardly be called 
large. 16 
From a military point of view keeping masonry forts was a potential disaster. 
If Pulaski could be reduced by an enemy, so could any other American masonry fort. 
Improved weaponry that was placed in forts could also be placed aboard ships. Steam 
powered warships with shallow drafts, like monitors, had more control over their 
movements and steadier gun platforms than traditional sailing vessels, thus narrowing 
the advantage forts traditionally held over vessels in the areas of fire control and fire 
efficiency. 
If the U.S. went to war with any advanced nation American forts might well 
have been destroyed along with their garrisons. If the navy was used to supplement 
the firepower of forts, the U.S. would have to maintain a home fleet large enough to 
15John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994) 379. 
16United States Government, A Compendium of the Ninth Census: June 1. 1870 
(Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office) 1872. 
72 
dock ironclads in every port with a fort. This would have been an expense greater 
than Congress was willing to authorize. Congress was gambling by keeping masonry 
forts as the primary means of defense for the nation. The most valuable lesson 
learned from McAllister was that the heaviest guns in existence, both smoothbores 
and rifles, could not destroy a fort made with properly constructed earth parapets. 17 
But this lesson was not learned until many years after the Civil War. 
"Seacoast Defenses" specifically recommended keeping permanent works and 
searching for ways to improve their defenses by using what would today be called 
reactive armor. The proof of earth's superiority over masonry was clear to anyone 
who read about the experiences of Fort McAllister, or Fort Fisher, or any other 
earthen fort. It was clear to Gillmore and it was clear to Sherman. These forts 
withstood attack after attack from both large smoothbores and rifled weapons, only 
falling when assaulted from land. So formidable were the earthen defenses of 
Wilmington that the port remained open until shortly before the Confederacy fell. 
All forts built by Southern engineers prior to the fall of Pulaski, prior to the 
proof of the superiority of rifled weapons over permanent works, were earthen forts. 
Masonry's obsolescence was not a factor in the decision; the Confederates were 
forced to build earthen forts because they did not have the time or the resources to 
construct permanent structures. The Confederacy faced an enemy that had invaded its 
soil and established a base on its shores. Port Royal was the largest, albeit the most 
undeveloped, harbor in the South. The Confederacy needed forts immediately to 
17Jones, "Military Lessons", 11-12. 
73 
prevent the loss of additional ports and harbors. The South needed its ports to 
maintain contact with Europe and to import war materials. 
Confederate engineers oversaw the construction of earthen coastal forts capable 
of withstanding the power of rifled guns. In their case, the change in construction 
material from masonry to earth was not in response to the recognition of a new threat, 
the rifled weapon, but because they lacked the resources and time to build forts like 
Pulaski. Although the lessons provided by earthen forts did not change the immediate 
future of coastal defense, it did have an impact later in the nineteenth century. 
The Endicott report of 1886 (named after Secretary of War, William C. 
Endicott) recommended construction of new coastal forts as one-tier works with 
dispersed batteries, built with reinforced concrete and padded with earth. The new 
forts utilized new technologies such as the "disappearing" gun carriage,18 improved 
metals for casting weapons, smokeless powder, perfection of breech loading and 
indirect gun sights. The forts constructed under the Endicott system were far superior 
to the Totten system in firepower and survivability. Even after the release of the 
Endicott's report, masonry works continued to playa role as a second line of defense 
or in times of emergency. A good example would be the remodeling of Fort Sumter 
during the Spanish-American War. However, by the tum of the century masonry 
works were abandoned by the military to become playthings for the curious and the 
novice historian. 
18The carriage utilized the recoil of the gun to lower it into the battery. This 
provided protection to the crew while loading. 
APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
ABATIS = Makeshift defense, usually made of felled trees or piled debris, designed 
to slow an assaulting force. Not intended as a permanent barrier to provide cover 
and/or concealment. 
AVENUE OF APPROACH = Route used by military forces to approach and assault 
an objective. 
BARBETTE GUN = Weapon whose barrel fired over a parapet. 
BAR SHOT= Solid shot made of two solid hemispheres connected by a bar. Used 
primarily against ship sails and riggings. 
BATTERY= Tactical unit comprised of artillery. Usually assigned four weapons. 
Equivalent to a company. 
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BOYAUX= Deep and narrow trenches used to communicate and move troops. Used 
extensively in sieges. 
BREVET RANK= Used to acknowledge the highest temporary rank held. In effect, 
the reduction to a lower rank was administrative. The reductions usually followed a 
major conflict when the military was reduced. It was also assigned to foreigners 
commensurate to the rank held in their native country. 
CANISTER SHOT= Type of shot consisting of a tin cylinder capped at both ends 
and packed with musket balls and sawdust. 
CARCASS = Type of shell filled with incendiary matter. 
CASEMATE GUN = Weapon that fired through an opening in a wall, called an 
embrasure. Weapon with overhead protection. 
CA V ALlERS = Mounds of earth built for protection against direct fire weapons. 
Used in sieges near the objective to allow plunging fire into the work. 
CHAIN SHOT= Type of solid shot that consisted of two hollowed or solid 
hemispheres connected by a chain. Used primarily against ship masts. 
75 
CHAMBER = Area in the bore of a weapon smaller than the diameter of the barrel. 
Designed to trap gases created when the weapon fired and to increase the velocity of 
the projectile. 
COPING= The top part of a wall, usually slanted to allow for drainage. 
COUNTER SCARP = Slope located on the outer side of a ditch in relation to a 
fortification. 
COVERED WAY = Outer rim of a demilune used as a defensive position that ran 
parallel to the counter scarp. Used mainly by infantrymen for protection. 
DEAD ANGLE= Area within one's field of fire that can not be reached by direct 
fire. Requires use of a weapon capable of plunging fire, such as a mortar. 
DEMILUNE= Outer defensive work attached to the main fortification, usually 
shaped like a triangle. Designed to protect the entrance of a fort from an assault. 
EMBRASURE= Opening in a wall that allowed weapons to fire through it. 
ENCEINTE= Main wall of a fortification. 
ENFILADE= To fire along the longest length of a target. 
F ASCINE = Bundle of branches tied together as a means of providing some 
protection, or as a foundation for a parapet. Used extensively in sieges due to the 
cost effectiveness and the ease with which they could be built. 
FIELDS OF FIRE= Pre-determined areas for the firing of weapons. Divided into 
primary fields and secondary fields. U sed to ensure all areas of the battlefield are 
covered. 
FORTIFICATION = An area strengthened to better withstand an attack. 
GABION = Basket made of wood and filled with earth. Designed to provide 
protection against rifle fire. Used extensively in sieges due to the cost effectiveness 
and the ease with which they could be built. 
GLACIS = Slope between the surrounding area and the covered way. 
GORGE= Opening or side of an area of the fort (attached or detached) that faced 
the center of the fortification. 
GRAPE SHOT= Type of solid shot comprised of nine balls held between two iron 
plates connected in the center with an iron rod. 
76 
HOLLOW SHOT= A hollowed projectile filled with powder. Designed to break 
apart upon impact or when a fuse ignited the internal powder. Covered a large area 
due to its bursting effect. 
LINE OF CIRCUMV ALLATION = Encirclement of a permanent work by sentries, 
fortified positions or trenches. Used to isolate a garrison prior to a siege or assault. 
LINE OF COUNTER-CIRCUMVALLATION= Encirclement of one's encampment 
by sentries, fortified positions or trenches. Used to protect one's main encampment. 
MORTELLO TOWER- A small, circular tower built of stone or brick used to defend 
harbors and seacoasts. 
PALISADE= Pointed wooden stakes, approximately six feet long. Planted close 
together at an angle to slow attacking forces. 
PARALLEL = Trench used by besieging armies dug parallel to the wall of a 
fortification, forming an arc to the point of attack. 
PARAPET= Part of a masonry or earthen wall located closest to the outside, 
designed to protect the defenders from gunfire. 
PLUNGING FIRE= Indirect fire. Used to attack targets behind protected works. 
Mortars use plunging fire. 
RAMPART= Top part of the main wall of a fortification, built of earth, masonry or 
a combination of both. Provided the main protection to defenders. 
REVETMENT= Retaining wall used in fortifications. 
SALIENT= Any angle of a fortified position that pointed toward the attacking force. 
SALLY PORT = Largest gate within a fortification used to bring supplies and heavy 
weapons inside. Also used as a quick egress for raiding parties. 
SAP= Narrow trench used in sieges that connected the main trenches, or parallels. 
SAP ROLLER= Gabion rolled in front of the sap, or trench, to provide protection in 
the front from small arms fire. 
SCARP = Outer slope of a rampart. 
SHRAPNEL= See "SPHERICAL CASE" 
SHELL= See "HOLLOW SHOT." 
SPHERICAL CASE= Thin sided hollow shot containing numerous musket balls. 
Designed to explode upon impact or at a specific time after leaving the weapon, 
spraying the area with dozens of small, lead balls. 
TERREPLEIN = Open area of a rampart on which the guns and crews operated. 
TRAVERSE = Large mound of dirt built between guns to provide flank protection. 
Especially used when guns were in close proximity to one another to prevent the 
dismounting of other guns. 
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Appendix B "Ranges of Heavy Artillery" 
Ranges of Field Guns and Howitzers 
Kl:'<U OF ORDNANCE Powder I Ball Elevation Range REMARKS 
I LBS I 0 YARDS 
6-PDR. flELD GUN [I 
Shot o 00 318 
1 00 674 
.. 2 00 867 
., ] CO \138 
~ 00 1256 
5 00 1523 
1.00 I Sph. Clse 2 00 650 Time of fligbt 2 sees. 
I shot 2 30 840 I 
.. .. 3 .. 
3 00 1050 
.. .. 4 .. 
I 
12-PDR. FIELD GUN 2.50 
I 
Shot o 00 347 
1 00 662 
., 
1 30 785 
I 200 909 
I 
.. }OO 
I 
1269 
.. 4 00 1455 
I 5 00 1663 
I 
1.50 Spb. case 1 00 670 TlIlle 2 seconds .. 1 45 950 
I 
.. 1 .. 
2 30 1250 
.. 4 .. 
",'lOW 12-PDR. GUN 2.50 I Sbot 000 325 .. 1 00 615 I .. 1 30 784 
I .. 200 876 ., 
300 1201 .. 400 1322 
.. 5 00 [619 
--
2.00 Shell 2 00 787 .. 2 30 926 
3 00 1079 
.. 3 75 1300 
2.50 Sph. case o 30 304 
., 1 00 574 .. 1 30 633 
.. 2 00 731 
.. 3 00 960 
3 ]0 1080 
., 
3 75 1135 
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Appendix B 
Ranges of Field Guns and Howitzers - Continued 
KlND OF ORDNANCE Powder Bail Elevation Range REl'v1ARKS 
LBS. 0 
, 
YARDS 
1Z·PDR. FIELD HOWITZER 1.00 I Sbell a 00 195 - 1 00 539 
Z 00 
I 
64D 
.. 3 00 847 
4 00 9'/5 .. 5 00 I 1072 
0.75 Spb. c:.se 2 15 4135 TIme 2 seconds .. 3 15 715 o. 3 .. 
3 45 1050 .. 4 .. 
24-PDR. FIELD HOWITZER 2.00 Sbell I a 00 295 .. I 00 I 516 .. 2 00 793 
.. 3 00 976 
.. 4 00 1272 
500 1322 
1.75 Sph. case 2 00 600 TUDe 2 seconds .. 3 00 800 .. 3 .. .. 5 30 1250 .. 4 .. 
2.00 .. 3 30 8S0 .. 3 .. 
32·PDR. FIELD HOWITZER 2.50 Shell o 00 290 
1 00 531 .. 200 779 .. 3 00 i029 .. 400 1203 
.. 500 1504 
2.50 Sph. case 3 00 800 Tune 2.75 seconds 
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KIND OF ORDNANCE 
lS·POR. SIEGE AND 
GARRISON GUN 
On barbene carriage 
24-PDR. SIEGE AND 
GARRISON GUN 
On siege carriage 
32·PDR. SEA·COAST GuN 
On Barbetu: carriage 
42·PDR. SEA·COAST GUN 
On barbette carriage 
Gibbons. The .\ rull(,jtt'f \:Igawql 
Appendix B 
Ranges of Heavy Ordnance 
Powder Ball Elevation Range 
LBS. . YARDS 
4.50 Sbot 1 00 641 .. 2 00 950 
3 00 1256 
.. -+ 00 1450 
.. 
I 5 00 1592 
6.00 Shot o 00 412 .. 1 00 842 
., 1 30 953 
., 2 00 1147 
.. 3 00 1417 
., 4 00 1666 .. 500 1901 
8.00 .. 100 883 .. 2 00 1170 
.. }/OO 1454 
.. 400 1639 
.. 5 00 1834 
6.00 Shot 1 45 900 
8.00 
.. 100 713 
.. 1 30 800 
1 35 900 
.. 200 1100 
.. 3 00 1433 
.. 400 1684 
.. 5 00 1922 
10.67 .. 1 00 780 
., 200 1155 
.. 300 1517 
10.50 Shot 100 775 .. 2 00 10lD 
.. 3 00 1300 .. 400 1600 
.. 5 00 1955 
14.00 .. I 00 770 .. 200 1128 
.. 3 00 !J80 .. 400 1687 
.. 5 00 1915 
RE:Y1ARKS 
'. 
: 
Carried over 
Appendix B 
Ranges of Heavy Ordnance - Continued 
KIND OF ORDNA.;-ICE Powder Ball Elevation Range RE;'v1ARKS 
LBS. 0 YARDS 
Shell 
8-INCH SIEGE HOWITZER 4.00 451bs. o 00 251 
GARRlSON GUN 
.. I 00 435 
On siege carriage 
I 
2 00 618 
.. 3 00 720 .. 400 992 
5 00 1241 
.. 12 30 2280 
Shell 
8-lNCH SEA-COAST 4.00 451bs. 100 405 
HOWITZER 
.. 200 652 
On barbene carriage 
.. 3 00 875 .. 400 1110 
.. 500 1300 
6.00 100 572 
200 828 
.. 300 947 
.. 400 1168 
.. 500 1463 
8.00 
.. 100 646 
.. 200 909 
.. 300 1190 
.. 400 1532 
.. 500 1800 
Shell 
lO-INCH SEA-COAST 12.00 901bs. 100 580 
HOWITZER 
.. 200 891 TIme. flight 3.00 sec . 
On barbette carriage 
.. 300 1185 -. .. .. 4.00 .. 
3 )0 1300 
.. 400 1426 .. .. 5.25 .. 
.. 500 1650 .. .. 6.00 .. 
Shot 
8-INCH COLUMBIAD 10.00 651bs. 100 932 Axis of gun 16 feet 
On barbette carriage 
.. 200 1116 above the water . 
.. 300 1402 
.. 400 1608 
.. 500 1847 
.. 600 2010 
.. 800 2397 Shot ceased to 
.. 1000 2834 ricochet on the water . 
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Appendix B 
Ranges of Heavy Ordnance - Continued 
KIl'-'D OF ORDNANCE Powder Ball Elevation Range REMARKS 
LBS. 
, YARDS 
Shot 
g·INCH COLUMBIAD 10.00 651bs. 15 00 3583 
Continued 
.. 20 00 4322 
On barbette carriage 
., 25 00 4875 
.. 27 00 4481 
15.00 " 27 30 4812 
Shell 
10.00 501bs. I 00 919 
" 2 00 1209 .. 3 00 1409 
" 400 1697 .. 
I 
5 00 1813 .. 600 1985 
" 8 01) 2203 
" 10 .00 2657 
" 1500 3556 .. 2000 3716 
" 25 00 4387 
.. 2700 4171 .. 27 30 4468 
Shot 
iO·INCH COLUMBIAD 18.00 1281bs. 000 394 Axis of gun 16 feet 
On barbette carriage 
.. I 00 752 above the water . 
" 2 00 1002 
3 00 1230 
" 400 1570 
" 5 00 1814 
.. 600 2037 '" Shot ceased to 
.. 8 00 2519 ricochet on water. 
.. 10 00 2777 .. 1500 3525 
.. 2000 4020 
" 25 00 4304 .. 3000 4761 
.. 35 00 5433 
20.00 .. 39 15 5654 
Appendix B 
Ranges a/Heavy Ordnance - Continued 
KIND OF ORDNANCE Powder Ball Elevation Range REMARKS 
LBS. . YARDS 
Shell 
to·INCH COLIJ1<tBIAD 12.00 1001bs. 1 00 800 I 
Continued .. 2 00 1012 
On barbette carriage 
.. 3 00 1184 
.. 400 1443 .. 5 00 1604 
18.00 .. o GO 448 .. I 00 747 .. I 2 00 1100 .. 3 00 1239 .. 4 00 1611 
5 00 1865 
.. 6 00 2209 
.. 800 2489 .. lD 00 2848 
.. 15 00 3200 
.. 20 00 
I 
3885 
.. 2500 4150 .. 30 00 4651 .. 35 00 4828 TIme of flight 35 sec. 
Shell -. -
12·INCH COLUMBlAD 20.00 Inlbs. 1000 2770 TIme of flight II sec. 
" IS 00 3731 .. .. 16 .. 
., 2200 4280 " .. 20 .. .. 25 00 4718 .. .. 26 " 
., 3000 5004 .. 35 00 5339 .. .. 32 .. 
.. 37 00 5266 .. .. 31 .. 
" 39 00 5064 
2S.00 .. 1000 2881 .. ., ILS .. 
IS 00 3542 .. .. IS .. 
.. 30 00 5102 
., 35 00 5409 .. ., 32 .. .. 37 00 5373 .. ., 32 " 
.. 39 00 5506 .. .. 36 .. 
Shell 35 00 5644 
1801bs_ 39 00 5615 
28.00 .. 35 00 5671 .. 39 00 5761 3'/. miles, TIme 36 sec, 
Gj~.1.>n.s. - .... . I .. ·." .. ,.'),.~ HOlllwl 
Appendix B 
Ranges 0.' Heavy Ordnance - Continued 
KIND OF ORDNANCE Powder Ball Elevation Range REl'vIARKS 
LBS. 
I 
Q YARDS 
i3-INCH SEA-COAST Shell 
MORTAR 20.00 200 ibs. 45 4325 
i2-[NCH SEA-COAST 
I 
Shell 
MORTAR 20.00 2001bs. 45 4625 Experimental 
I 
lO-INCH SEA-COAST Shell 
MORTAR !O.OO 981bs. 45 4250 Time of flight 36 sec. 
Shell 
lO-[NCH SIEGE MORTAR 1.00 901bs. 45 300 Time of flight 6.5 sec. 
1.50 " 45 700 
., " 12 
2,00 " 45 1000 " " 14 " 
2.50 " 45 1300 " " 16 " 
3.00 " 45 1600 " " 18 .. 
3.50 .. 45 1800 .. .. 19 .. 
4.00 .. 45 2!00 .. " 21 .. 
Ibs, oz. Shell 
8-INCH SIEGE MORTAR o 10'/. 46lbs. 45 500 Tune of flight [0 sec. 
From Griffith's 13'1. " 45 600 " .. 11 .. 
Artillerist's Man ual 1 00 .. 45 750 " " 12'/ • .. 
1 02 .. 45 900 .. .. 13 " 
1 03'1, " 45 1000 " " 13'1, .. 
1 04'1. .. 45 1100 .. " 14 " 
1 06 " 45 1200 .. .. 14'1, .. 
oz. Shell 
24-POUNDER COEHOR.."I 0.50 171bs. 45 25 
MORTAR 1.00 .. 4S 68 
1.50 .. 45 104 
1.75 .. 45 143 
2,00 .. 45 165 
2.75 .. 45 260 
4.00 .. 45 422 
6.00 " 45 900 
8.00 " 45 1200 
Gibbons. VI( 1rrillrr;'jl'! Mu nual 
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APPENDIX C 
NAVAL ATTACKS ON FORT McALLISTER 
On 1 July 1862.1 The USS Potomska's captain reported the existence of 
McAllister, which he described as an earthen battery with six mounted heavy guns. 
The Potomska briefly engaged the battery with four 32-pounder guns and a 24-
pounder Parrott with no effect. 2 
On 29 July, the gunboats USS Paul Jones, Unadilla, Huron and Madgie 
navigated the Ogeechee River in an attempt to destroy the Rattlesnake (which they 
did) and reconnoiter the earthen fort. The commander of the Union force reported 
seven to eight heavy guns, confirmed the pilings in advance of the fort, and described 
his two-and-a-half hour duel with the fort as ineffective. 3 
On 19 November 1862 the U.S. Navy attacked McAllister with the mission of 
trying to remove the pilings and destroy the fort. The task force consisted of two 
gunboats and a mortar schooner. 4 The engagement lasted a little over six hours and 
resulted in Federal withdrawal after the flagship received damage at the water line. 
IFor information regarding Union vessels and their armament, see appendix D. 
20R (Navy), series I, vol. 13, 161-162. 
30R (Navy), series I, vol. 13, 162 & 221. The largest weapons aboard were one 
100 and one 3D-pounder Parrott and three 11" Dahlgren guns (sb). 
4The gunboats were the USS Wissahickson and Dawn. 
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Approximately two hundred rounds were expended by the vessels and only a dozen by 
the fort. Only minor damage occurred to McAllister. 5 
On 27 January 1863, two monitors, two gunboats and a mortar schooner 
attempted again to disarm the fort and remove the obstacles. 6 This attack included a 
IS" Dahlgren smoothbore, the largest gun in the Navy's arsenal. This was the first 
time a gun this size was used against an earthen fort. After four hours and twenty 
minutes of firing the Union force withdrew, having inflicted no permanent damage to 
the fort. Over three hundred rounds were expended by the vessels. 7 Rear Admiral 
Samuel F. DuPont, Commander of South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, learned from 
the captains of the attacking vessels that the fort was impervious to solid shot. He 
also learned that shells disrupted the earth parapets fairly well, but with the help of 
slaves the garrison repaired most of the damage overnight. The only hope of 
navigating up the Ogeechee River in pursuit of blockade runners would be to steam 
quickly past the fort, which was deemed impossible due to the pilings and torpedoes 
(sea mines). 8 
On 1 February 1863, a six hour attack came from a force consisting of the 
USS Seneca, USS Wissahickson and USS C.P. Williams. Learning some lessons 
from the previous attack, the crews used smaller caliber shells which caused more 
5Jones, Chatham Artillery, 115, OR (Navy), series I, vol. 13, 454. 
~he vessels were the USS Montauk, Seneca, Wissahickson, Dawn and C. P. 
Williams. 
70R (Navy), series I, vol. 13, 547-5488. 
8ibid., 626-628. 
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damage and allowed their vessels to maintain a rapid rate of fire. Much damage was 
done to the earthen parapets, one gun was dismounted and one fatality occurred: the 
fort's commanding officer, Major John B. Gallie.9 
The last naval attack against McAllister occurred on 1 March 1863.10 Severe 
damage was inflicted upon the fort during the three hour attack. The mortar boats 
continued to fire periodically throughout the night, forcing the garrison to use soldiers 
to repair the damage instead of slaves. The next morning when the Federal Navy 
arrived it saw much of the damage repaired and the fort ready for action. The 
mission commander decided another attack would be useless and the Federal vessels 
withdrew to Ossabaw Sound. 
9ibid., 632-633, 730-733. 
IOThe vessels were the USS Passaic, Patapsco, C.P. Williams, Para, and Norfolk 
Packet. The largest weapon aboard were 15" Dahlgren guns and a 150-pounder Parrot. 
APPENDIX D 
ARMAMENT OF UNION VESSELS ATTACKING McALLISTER! 
MONITORS 
USS Montuk 
description: screw steamer; wood and iron; single turret, 750 tons 
battery: one IS" Dahlgren (sb), one 9" Dahlgren (sb) 
USS Nahant 
description: screw steamer; iron; single turret; 1,875 tons 
battery: one IS" Dahlgren (sb), one 11" Dahlgren (sb) 
USS Passaic 
description: screw steamer; wood and iron; single turret; 1,875 tons 
battery: one IS" Dahlgren (sb), one ISO-pounder Parrott 
USS Patapsco 
description: screw steamer; wood and iron; single turret, 844 tons 
battery: one IS" Dahlgren (sb), one ISO-pounder Parrott 
GUNBOATS 
USS Dawn 
description: screw steamer, wood, 399 tons, schooner 
battery: two 32-pounder (sb), one 20-pounder Parrott 
USS Huron 
description: screw steamer, wood, 507 tons, two-masted schooner 
battery: one 11" Dahlgren (sb), one 20-pounder Parrott, two 24-pounder howitzers 
USS Madgie 
description: screw steamer, wood, 220 tons 
battery: one 30-pounder Parrott, one 20-pounder Parrott 
USS Potomski 
description: screw steamer, wood, three masted schooner, 287 tons 
battery: four 32-pounders (sb), one 20-pounder Parrott 
!ORN, vol. 2. 
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USS Paul Jones 
description: side-wheel steamer, gunboat, 863 tons 
battery: one 100-pounder Parrott, two 9" Dahlgren (sb), one 11" Dahlgren (sb), two 
50-pounder Parrotts, two 24-pounder howitzers 
USS Seneca 
description: screw steamer, wood, 507 tons, gunboat, two masted schooner 
battery: 11" Dahlgren (sb), one 20-pounder Parrott, two 24-pounder howitzers; after 
23 October 1863 an additional one light 12-pounder (sb) was added 
USS Wissahickson 
description: screw steamer, wood, two masted schooner, gunboat, 507 tons 
battery: one 11" Dahlgren (sb), 1 20-pounder Parrott, two 24-pounder howitzer; after 
February 1863, the 11" Dahlgren was replaced by a ISO-pounder Parrott 
USS Unadilla 
description: screw steamer, wood, two masted schooner, 507 tons 
battery: one 20-pounder Parrott, one 11 " Dahlgren (sb), two 24-pounder howitzers 
MORTAR BOATS 
USS C.P. Williams 
description: sails, wood, schooner, 210 tons 
battery: one 13" mortar, two 32-pounders (sb), two heavy 12-pounders (sb) 
USS Norfold Packet 
description: sails, wood, schooner, 349 tons, 
battery: one 13" mortar, two 32-pounders (sb), two 12-pounder howitzers 
USS Para 
description: sails, wood, schooner, 200 tons 
battery: one 13" mortar, two 32-ponders (sb) 
APPENDIX E 
UNION DEMAND FOR THE SURRENDER OF FORT PULASKI 
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, 
TYBEE ISLAND, GA., APRIL 10, 1862 
To the COMMANDING OFFICER, Fort Pulaski: 
90 
SIR: I hereby demand of you the immediate surrender and restoration of Fort 
Pulaski to the authority and possession of the United States. This demand is made 
with a view to avoiding, if possible, the effusion of blood which must result from the 
bombardment and attack now in readiness to be opened. 
The number, caliber and completeness of the batteries surrounding you leave 
no doubt as to what must result in case of your refusal; and as the defense, however 
obstinate, must eventually succumb to the assailing force at my disposal, it is hoped 
you may see fit to avert the useless waste of life. 
The communication will be carried to you under a flag of truce by Lieut. J. H. 
Wilson, U. S. Army, who is authorized to wait any period not exceeding thirty 
minutes from delivery for your answer. 
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 
DAVID HUNTER 
Major-General, Commanding 
Sir: 
APPENDIX F 
TERMS OF SURRENDER 
FORT PULASKI, Ga., April11, 1862. 
I have the honor to transmit herewith the terms of capitulation for the 
surrender to the United States of Fort Pulaski, Ga., signed by approval, they being 
substantially those authorized by you as commander of the district. 
The fort hoisted the white flag at a quarter before 2 o'clock this afternoon, 
after a resistance since 8 o'clock yesterday morning to the continuous fire of our 
batteries. A practicable breach in the walls was made in eighteen and a half hours' 
firing by daylight. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
Q. A. GILLMORE 
Brig. Gen. Vols., Comdg. 
U.S. Forces at Tybee Island, GA. 
91 
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Brig. Gen. H. W. Benham, 
Comdg. N. Dist. Dept. of the South, Tybee Island, Ga. 
Terms of capitulation agreed upon for the surrender to the forces of the United States 
of Fort Pulaski, Cockspur Island, Ga. 
ARTICLE 1. The fort, armament, and garrison to be surrendered at once to 
the forces of the United States. 
ART 2. The officers and men of the garrison to be allowed to take with them 
all their private effects, such as clothing, bedding, books, &c; this not to include 
private weapons. 
Art 3. The sick and wounded, under charge of the hospital steward of the 
garrison, to be sent up under a flag of truce to the Confederate lines, and at the same 
time the men to be allowed to send up any letters they may desire, subject to the 
inspection of a Federal Officer. 
Signed this the 11th day of April, 1862, at Fort Pulaski, Cockspur Island, GA. 
CHAS. H. OLMSTEAD, 
Colonel First Vol. Regt. of Georgia, Comdg. 
Fort Pulaski 
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David Eldridge was born at on  
His family settled in Orange Park, Florida, after David's father retired from the U.S. 
Air Force at Charleston Air Force Base in 1980. He attended Orange Park High 
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